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A New Era for British Politics?
04 | Maio | 2010
Bernardo Pires de Lima |
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in The Majalla Magazine, N. 1552, 4|Maio|2010
For the first time in British electoral history, candidates agreed about holding televised debates. Ironically, these debates created a wave of enthusiasm around Nick Clegg, the designated winner of the first one, which gave the campaign an extra interest.
Elections rarely focus on foreign policy, but states’ life often does. In Britain’s case, and due to its international behavior over the past decade, foreign policy became a relevant outcome to every government in charge. Tony Blair began his premiership by speculating that his generation might be the first never to fight a war. At the end of his era, he had waged five, some of which could have made him lose his job. Can one look to the current campaign and say that all politics are local? Yes. Yet, it can be argued that perhaps no other general election has debated the relationship with Europe and its financial crisis as much as this one: Britain has become a European player, and the pivotal party in the general election, the Liberal Democrats, are openly pro-European.
Different international approaches
The British relationship with Europe has been a mix of choice and necessity. When the Empire came to an end and the British international trade looked for alternatives, Europe was the first in line. The pragmatism of the Conservative and Labour parties resulted in full EU membership in 1973 (then the European Economic Community), and assumed the three circles of British foreign policy designed by Churchill’s government at the end of the Second World War: the special relationship among the United States, Europe and the British Empire. Europe became part of the internal debate between the major parties and within them, and it was exactly the European election in 1989 that gave the first political victory to Labour since the beginning of Margaret Thatcher’s era.
The Conservative Party was deeply influenced by the Iron Lady on European affairs. Thatcher was skeptical of every uncontrolled political transformation, and against all kinds of federalist approaches. This tradition is quite obviously reflected in David Cameron’s leadership. Cameron was against the Lisbon Treaty and asked for a national referendum, which was always refused by Prime Minister Gordon Brown. Cameron knows that the conservative audience in Britain is suspicious of European integration and the apparent benign intentions led by France and Germany, and he believes that this mindset is correct to win the political center. It is not.
If one looks at the Conservative electoral manifesto, there is a chapter dedicated to foreign policy titled, “promote our national interest,” which entails a “positive membership” of the EU. This chapter begins with two figures that show the centrality of the UK’s trade links with the EU, much more so than the UK’s trade relations with the rest of the world. Cameron wants to deliver a clear message: The British membership is, first of all, ruled by pragmatic approaches and, secondly, defined by instrumental issues. Moreover, the Tories assume that their government would never take the UK into the euro and will re-negotiate the Charter of Fundamental Rights, on criminal justice and on social and employment legislation. In other words, the moderate approach towards Europe that gave three consecutive mandates to Labour is now being neglected by the Tory leadership, which needs to convince a non-conservative electorate if it wants to guarantee a strong majority in parliament.
In the last 15 years, the Labour Party has done more for the UK’s relationship with Europe than all the British governments in the previous 50. Firstly, it won three consecutives parliamentary majorities with a pro-European discourse with a prudent enthusiasm. It was the exact measure to transform the old Labour into the New Labour, promote British interests abroad, and win the support of unhappy Liberal Democrats and Conservatives. Secondly, the Labour Party has always pushed for a realistic European approach pursuing the intention to follow a global role. Blair emphasized the great importance of security and defense instruments, the trade liberalization, or the need to review the common agricultural policy that consumes more than half of the EU’s budget. Thirdly, the Labour Party was able to define a British approach in European affairs that outlined as one of its vital issues the relationship with the US. This was particularly evident in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and during the Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq wars. The question is: Does Gordon Brown think the same way?
In some points, he does not. Brown will never be so close to the US as Blair was, in part because of the consequences of the so-called special relationship during the Bush administration, but also because Brown will be reluctant to neglect British interests in other parts of the world economy, such as India, China, South Africa or the Middle East. Both Conservative and Labour manifestos are comfortable with this perspective: There must be a renewed Anglo-American partnership, more balanced, without jeopardizing other British interests overseas.
Prime Minister Brown will never be as ideological as Blair regarding the use of force. He will access several times the situation before sending British troops to critical scenarios. And, like his opponent David Cameron, Brown will never put at stake the UK’s independence on nuclear power, especially in a phase of UN Security Council reform and uncontrolled nuclear proliferation worldwide.
This is the point that shows how unrealistic the Lib Dem leader, Nick Clegg, can be. The most pro-European of the three candidates—he defends the notion that Britain should join the euro—is also the only one who defends global nuclear disarmament starting in the UK, not in Iran or North Korea. The party’s electoral manifesto does not even mention these threats. Besides, his reluctant pro-American mindset anticipates tensions in the UK-US bilateral relationship in the case that he creates a coalition to form a parliamentary majority in a time of economic crises. The Lib Dem manifesto on foreign affairs could be seen as a bundle of good intentions, “a force for good in the world,” to quote Clegg on the second television debate, which is, in fact, the slogan offered by Tony Blair in 1997. Surprisingly, the liberal internationalist approach (followed by Blair) doesn’t deserve one single word on the Liberal Democrat manifesto. It seems soft for a party that became central to any post-election coalition scenario.
Post-election scenarios
For the first time in British electoral history, candidates agreed about holding televised debates. Ironically, these debates created a wave of enthusiasm around Nick Clegg, the designated winner of the first one, which gave the campaign an extra interest. Besides the two traditional parties looking to 10 Downing Street, all polls have transformed the campaign into a wider arena for three. Clegg has a fresh style on television, proposals that both Conservatives and Labour electorates can support and, above all, represents those tired of bipartisan rotation in power. This surprise effect balanced the polls so much that no one will get the majority in the House of Commons: a hung parliament (the first since 1974) is now the most expected scenario, which puts the Lib Dem as the pivotal party of any coalition government. Moreover, we could see another phenomenon: Labour, the third party at polls, will get more MPs than Conservatives who came first at polls. One of the possible coalitions is exactly a Lib-Lab government with a parliamentary majority, expressing the electorate will of a strong and pro-European government in a time of crisis. And if we look at the differences of foreign policy between the Tories and Liberal Democrats, the Lib-Lab coalition not only will mark the beginning of the end of the British traditional electoral system, but also the start of a tremendous struggle within the Conservative Party to succeed David Cameron. New times are coming to Britain.
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