European Elections and National Politics: Lessons from the “New” Southern European Democracies

André Freire, ISCTE - Instituto Superior de Ciências do Trabalho e da Empresa e Eftichia Teperoglou, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
Introduction: Main Objectives of the Paper

The 2004 European (EP) elections marked a major change in the European Union’s (EU) existence: due to the enlargement that took place in the beginning of the year, ten new member states (Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) participated in those elections. Of those countries, eight (all except Cyprus and Malta) are consolidating democracies that until around the beginning of the 1990’s were under authoritarian Communist rule. Thus, they had their first EP elections around fourteen years after their first democratic elections.

The new Southern European democracies that are also members of the EU (Greece, Portugal, and Spain) share some characteristics with the eight post-communist democracies that might be relevant for the study of European elections. First, Greece, Portugal, and Spain began their transitions to democracy in the beginning of the seventies (1974, for the first two countries, and 1975 for the latter). Consequently, they share an authoritarian heritage with the new consolidating democracies of East and Central Europe. Second, the new Southern European democracies also had their first European elections shortly after their first national democratic elections (Greece in 1981, seven years after the first democratic elections; Portugal and Spain in 1987, twelve and ten years after the first democratic elections, respectively). From 1981/87 until 2004, five (Portugal and Spain) or six (Greece) European elections took place in the new Southern European democracies. We derive our research questions in the present paper bearing those characteristics in mind. Firstly, in terms of the short and long-term impacts of national factors upon voting behaviour regarding EP elections, what general lessons can be learned (by both established and consolidating democracies, but especially by the latter) from the longitudinal study of EP contests in Greece, Portugal, and Spain? Secondly, what lessons can be learned (by both established and consolidating democracies, but especially by the latter) about the long-term impact of EP election voting behaviour upon national electoral politics? Or, to put it more generally, what lessons can be learned about the inter-relations of first- and second-order elections in new democracies? Thus, the main aim of this paper is to explore, both in a
longitudinal and comparative approach, the inter-relations between legislative and European voting behaviour in the new Southern European democracies.

The theoretical framework of the paper is mainly the perspective which was first presented by Reif and Schmitt (1980) following the first European Elections in 1979, i.e., the so-called second-order elections model. First-order elections are those where there is much at stake, that is, the control of executive power (in the political system). This means that in parliamentary systems, legislative elections are first-order, as are elections for the head of state in presidential regimes; other elections, where the control of executive power in the political system is not at stake (such as is the case with EP elections) are known as second-order national elections (see also Reif, 1985b; Eijk and Franklin, 1996; and Marsh, 1998).

Due to their second-order nature, EP elections are usually contended by the same actors (parties, candidates, etc.), emphasizing mainly the same (national) issues and de-emphasizing European issues. Thus, voting behaviour is basically structured by the same contextual supply-side (national) factors as in first-order national elections. However, not all the contextual constraints active in first-order elections are active in EP elections: namely, there are usually no constraints in terms of government formation, since these elections have usually no impact in terms of executive power formation; furthermore, since the EP has no major consequences for national (or European) politics, electors are more free to “vote with their heart” (i.e., ideologically) than in first-order elections, where they more often “vote with their head” (i.e., tactically). Basically, there are three major “modes” of voting in EP elections: “voting with the head”, “voting with the heart”, and “voting with the boot” (Franklin, 2005; Eijk and Franklin, 1996b; Eijk, Franklin, and Oppenhuis, 1996; Oppenhuis, Eijk, and Franklin, 1996). “Voting with the head” is when voters take account of strategic considerations (so as to not waste votes on parties that are unlikely to have a say in government formation; and to avoid voting for those parties which might have a destabilizing effect upon the parliament); “Voting with the heart” is to vote in the most preferred party without taking into account any strategic considerations; “Voting with the boot” is often protest voting, against the incumbent government, the political class, the programs and/or the candidates of
the parties voters would normally vote for, etc., or to indicate support for a particular policy (Franklin, 2005: 4-5).

In EP elections, most voters “vote with the head” (mirroring their voting behaviour in first-order elections). In these elections the number of those who vote with their heart or with their boot varies according to many factors, especially the timing of the national electoral cycle. Second-order elections, in general, and EP elections, in particular, provide opportunities for voters defect the parties they would normally vote for in first-order elections. “(…)The very fact that such voters are provided with an opportunity to ignore partisanship that they would have displayed in a national election will itself affect their political socialization (Franklin, 2005: 6).” Mark Franklin envisages two major possible results of those opportunities for defection in EP elections. First, “(…) the experience of voting differently will affect socialization across the board and delay or prevent the acquisition of strong national partisanship (Franklin, 2005: 7).” This first effect might be especially disturbing for new democracies, creating major difficulties for the stabilization of the political and party systems by delaying of even preventing the establishment of stable patterns of voting behaviour. Second, “(…) it is possible that the different socializing experiences of these young voters will affect only their behaviour in EP elections, building an awareness that EP elections are different even while allowing them to acquire just as strong a partisanship in national elections as earlier cohorts of voters did. (Franklin, 2005: 7)”

Considering only the new Southern European democracies, this paper has three main objectives. First, we want to test the short-term and the long-term impacts of national factors on voting behaviour in EP elections. The long-term impacts will be tested by our comparing the evolution of the party system, in terms of the “effective number of electoral parties”, across legislative and EP elections. As for the short-term impacts, we will test theories of electoral cycles by comparing aggregate electoral returns of the governmental parties across first-order and EP elections in different periods of the national electoral cycle.
Second, we want to evaluate the specificity of voting behaviour in EP elections, vis-à-vis voting behaviour in first-order contests, namely in terms of the extent to which the opportunities for defection in EP elections are in fact used by voters. To test this, we will compare the performance of the large, medium and small-sized parties in first order and EP elections. Additionally, we will test to see whether or not the social and ideological anchors of partisanship are different across these two types of elections.

Third, we will evaluate the impact of voting behaviour in EP elections on the anchors of partisanship (in new democracies). For the three countries, this will be done by evaluating the following: the evolution of “quasi-switching” in EP elections (1989-2004); the social and ideological anchors of partisanship (to see whether or not they are different across these two types of elections); and, finally, the levels of electoral volatility in legislative and EP elections. Before evaluating our objectives, we would like to present some contextual information in the next two sections.

I. The Role Of Elections In The Three Political Systems

Portugal’s transition to democracy was initiated by a coup led by junior military officers, who committed themselves to holding free and fair popular elections one year from the date of coup. Prior to Portugal’s relatively bloodless Revolution of Carnations on April 25, 1974, free and fair elections with universal suffrage and a competitive party system were unheard of in the nation. The Portuguese Constituent Assembly elections were held on schedule on April 25, 1975, and these were followed by the first free constitutional legislative elections one year later, on April 25, 1976.

In contrast to the revolutionary transition to democracy in Portugal, Spain’s political evolution, which was also extensive, unfolded within the institution and procedures established under Francisco Franco, the former dictator (Bruneau et. al. 2001). In the Spanish democratization process, the role of King Juan Carlos I and the relationship between the military and government played a crucial role. The Spanish Constitution (SC) was approved by the Spanish legislative chamber (Cortes
Generales) on October 31, 1978, ratified by national referendum on December 6 and signed by the King on December 27, 1978.

Portugal’s political system is semi-presidential, and thus the only two institutions with national electoral legitimacy and a responsibility for forming government are the President of the Republic (PR) and the National Assembly. The Head of State is the directly-elected president (through a majority run-off system). The political form of the Spanish State is the Parliamentary Monarchy and the King is the Head of State.

The Greek military regime established by George Papadopoulos and his fellow right-wing colonels had been in power for only 7 years, as opposed to the long lasting regimes of Salazar and Caetano (1926/33-1974), and Franco (1939-1975). The first free parliamentary elections (November 17, 1974) took place under the leadership of the National Unity government, led by Constantine Karamanlis. Later in that same year, the majority of the electoral body expressed, in a referendum, its will against crowned democracy. The revised Greek Constitution of 1975/1986 introduced a parliamentary government system. The President of the Republic (PR) is the Head of State who is elected by the Greek Parliament.

In the three countries, national legislative elections ultimately determine which party will form the Government, and who will become Prime Minister. These are clearly the most important elections in the three political systems under study.

Greece became a member of the European Community/European Union by the 1st of January, 1981. The first European Parliament (EP) election was held on October 18, 1981. Five years later, on January 1st, 1986, Spain and Portugal joined the European Community and the first European Parliament (EP) elections were called on June 10, 1987 and on July 19, 1987 respectively.
II. The Electoral Systems In Legislative And Ep Elections

The Greek legislative elections are contested under an electoral system of proportional representation, which is paradoxically called a “reinforced system of proportional representation” (in force since 1958). Unlike the Portuguese and the Spanish electoral systems, which are single-tiered, the Greek system is multi-tiered. The Greek system has changed significantly since 1974, according to Lijphart’s criteria (1994: 47-49). For the 1989-90 elections a less disproportional system was applied (Nikolakopoulos, 1989: 94): the “effective threshold” was 3.3 (Lijphart, 1994: 74, and 71-89); between 1977 and 1985, the “effective threshold” fluctuated between 14.7 and 18.8 (Lijphart, 1994: 87). Since the 1993 legislative election, the electoral system has been very similar to the one used in 1985.

Electoral systems across different types of Portuguese elections are quite similar, except for the presidential contests (Freire, 2004). Both legislative and European elections are fought under the d’Hondt system of proportional representation (PR), and voters are not permitted to express preferences for particular candidates (closed lists). During the democratic period, the only significant change in the legislative elections’ electoral system was the reduction in the number of MPs from the 1991 election on, from 250 to 230. This latter change resulted in a minor reduction of the average district magnitude (1975-87: 11.4 seats per district; from 1991 onwards: 10.5).

The Spanish electoral system for legislative elections is the d’Hondt system of proportional representation (PR), and voters vote from closed lists. Moreover, considering again Lijphart’s criteria, no significant change has occurred since the system was first applied in 1977 (Lijphart, 1994: 59; Montero, 1994 and 1998). There are 350 seats in dispute in a total of 52 electoral districts; the average district magnitude is 6.73 (Lijphart, 1994: 59).

The Greek and Spanish electoral systems for legislative elections are very disproportional in terms of seat allocation; more specifically, they have similar results to those found in majoritarian systems and, namely, the levels of disproportionality are much higher than those found in Portugal (Rose, 1984;
Montero, 1994 and 1998; Lopes and Freire, 2002: 153). Therefore, it could be supported that the main purpose of the Greek electoral system is to manufacture a one-party parliamentary majority in each election and to allow alternation over time between the two major parties (Mavrogordatos, 1984:163). In this respect, the Spanish case lies between those of Portugal and Greece. Another two differences when comparing the electoral system of Greece to those of Portugal and Spain are that voting in Greece is compulsory (although with weak enforcement), and preferential voting is allowed.

However, we should bear in mind that in the three countries constituencies of extremely different magnitude do coexist, especially in the case of Portugal. This imbalance of district magnitude provides the small parties with the possibility of obtaining parliamentary representation by focusing their efforts on the largest constituencies. Therefore, the so-called constraining influence of the (Greek) electoral system is, consequently, not as strong as one might expect (Diamantopoulos, 2001: 197).
Moreover, in the Spanish case the centre-periphery cleavage is very strong, and so there are several regionalist/nationalist political parties all over the country, especially in the historical regions (The Basque Country, Catalonia, and to a much lower extent in Galicia). The regionalist/nationalist parties are very small on the national level but are large enough (often, very large) in their regions to achieve...
parliamentary representation and to, overall, be fairly treated by the electoral system. On the contrary, the small and medium-sized parties with a geographically disperse vote are those which are most penalized by the Spanish electoral system (Montero, 1994 and 1998). In Figure 1, we present the difference between the “effective number of electoral parties” (ENEP) and the “effective number of parliamentary parties”ii (ENPP) in national legislative elections from 1974 to 2004. There we can see that the Greek (except for 1989-93) and the Spanish electoral systems experienced a greater reduction in party fragmentation than the Portuguese one. However, since the middle of the nineties there has been a certain convergence between the three countries in this respect.iii

As for EP elections in the three countries, the state consists of one single constituency returning 24 MEPs for Portugal and Greece (for Portugal, 24 seats: 1987-89 and 2004; 25 seats, 1994-99; for Greece, 24 seats: 1981-1989 and 2004; 25 seats: 1994-99) and 54 MEPs for Spain (60 seats: 1987-89/1989-94; 64 seats: 1994-99; 54 seats: 2004). In the three countries, European elections are conducted with proportional representation, and voters are not permitted to express preferences for particular candidates. Only in Greece is there a legal threshold (3%), which was introduced for the first time in 1994, and which has since then remained at around that value. The effective threshold for Portugal (1987-89: 3%) and Spain (1987-89: 1.2%) are equal or very similar to that of Greece. For further information, see Lijphart, 1994; Castillo, 1994 and 1996; Colomé, 2005.

In Portugal, the difference between EP and legislative electoral systems in terms of benefits/punishments for small (8% of the vote or less) and medium-sized parties (9%-20% of the vote) shows a contradiction: if we consider only the two largest districts in elections for the national parliament (around 48 and 38 seats), the legislative electoral system can be said to be more fair; if we consider average district magnitude for legislative elections (see above), the reverse is true. Moreover, on the one hand, since a single constituency for the whole country is involved, more votes (in absolute terms) are needed to elect each MEP, so the system puts a higher threshold for small parties. On the other hand, it clearly can be said that the EP electoral system favors small and medium-sized parties, since fewer resources are
needed for electoral campaigns in a single district. Considering the characteristics of the electoral systems in Greek and Spanish legislative elections (which are much more disproportional than in Portugal) and EP elections (which are basically similar to those of Portugal), we can say that in Greece, as opposed to Portugal, small and medium/small-sized parties have much greater chances of getting chosen in EP elections than in legislative ones. For the Spanish case the latter proposition is true only for the small and medium-sized parties with geographically dispersed votes (PCE/IU, CDS). However, for the regionalist parties which benefited the most from the geographic concentration of their vote in national elections, it is much more difficult to achieve representation in EP than in legislative elections, and that is why these parties usually ran in a coalition for the European elections (Castillo, 1994 and 1996; Colomé, 2005).

III. The Party Systems In Legislative And Ep Elections

The Greek party system has been characterized by a three-block alignment, but the competition for government power has always been bipolar (see Lyrintzis, 1984, Mavrogordatos, 1984). More specifically, the major parties are the centre-right party of New Democracy (ND), the centre-left party of Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and the Greek Communist Party (KKE).iv

Portuguese democratic politics has been dominated by four major parties (see Lopes and Freire, 2002; Bruneau et. al., 2001): the centre-left Socialist Party (PS); the centre-right Social Democratic Party (PSD); the PCP (an orthodox communist party); and the right-wing CDS-PP (Social Democratic Centre – Popular Party).

The Spanish party system has been dominated on the national level by two parties that have alternately held power: the center-left Socialist Party (PSOE) and the right-wing conservative Popular Party (PP). The PSOE has always been the major party of the left, but on the right side of the ideological spectrum things were different since before 1982 (a critical and realigning election). Until 1979 the centre-right UCD (Union of the Democratic Centre) dominated the right side of the
ideological spectrum, although there was another relevant party (the AP: the Popular Alliance, the predecessor of the PP). In 1982, the UCD collapsed, mainly due to internal divisions; one of its factions formed the centre-right CDS (Social Democratic Centre), which have not achieved parliamentary representation since 1993. However, since 1982 the PP has dominated the right side of the ideological spectrum. Given the significance and the number of regional parties, though, as well as the presence of small but highly relevant national parties (The Communists: the PCE/IU; the AP, 1977-79; and the CDS, 1982-89), we could characterize the Spanish party system as moderate pluralism (see Bruneau et.al. 2001; Montero, 1994).

Additionally, small and micro parties from both the left and the right have persisted in Greek, Portuguese, and Spanish politics. The total percentage of the Greek micro parties is insignificant compared to the performance of the Portuguese and Spanish micro parties (in the latter country, the category includes, above all, the several regionalist parties: the PNV, HB, CiU, ERC, and BNG) most probably due to the higher thresholds for parliamentary representation in Spain’s electoral system.

In Portugal, the two major parties (the PS and PSD) have always controlled government, be it in a single party format (either with an absolute majority of seats, or with a plurality) or in coalition (the PS/CDS; the SD/CDS/PPM; the PSD/CDS). In the case of Spain, governments were always of the single party type, while also being controlled by one of the two major parties (the UCD, PSOE or PP). However, one of the two major parties always obtained either an absolute majority in Parliament or only a plurality of seats. In the latter cases, governments received extra-parliamentary support from other parties: the PNV, CiU, CC, IU, ERC (there were different parties on different occasions). Nevertheless, these latter parties did not share the cabinet’s posts. Therefore, while in Portugal, government coalitions are part of the democratic history of the political system, in Greek politics they are exceptions (only from June 1989 to April 1990; see Verney, 1990). Spain is yet another case: the majoritarian type of government (single-party) was not always supported by a single-party majority of seats in Parliament.
Figure 2: Bipartisan Trends in Legislative Elections

Date: year of national election

Sources: see Figure 1 above.
Even considering the fundamental transformation of the Portuguese party system in a majoritarian direction (since 1987), we can say that there are two major structural characteristics distinguishing the evolution of the Portuguese party system from that of Greece. Firstly, majoritarianism began in Greece much earlier (in terms of votes, in 1981, but in terms of the “effective number of parliamentary parties”, in 1974); secondly, majoritarianism has always been much stronger in Greece (see Figures 2 and 3; see also Bruneau, et al, 2001). “Reinforced proportional representation” is certainly an important element in explaining these two differences (as the gap between the ENEP and the ENPP in Greece and Portugal show us, especially for the period 1974-85; see Figure 1 above). Spain is a case in between. After a more fragmented party system (“moderate pluralism”), associated with single-party government (supported by a plurality of seats), until 1982, the
system knew some trends towards majoritarianism: the PSOE won three absolute majorities of seats in Parliament (1982-1989) (Montero, 1994). However, the latter period can be better characterized as a “predominant party system”. It was only since 1993 that the concentration of the vote in the two major parties achieved something similar to a bipartisan format (see Figure 2).

As we can see in Figure 2, in all the three countries, and at least since the end of the eighties/beginning of the nineties, there has been a clear bipartisan trend in the party system. Did the developments in the party system that occurred in legislative elections, though, also take place in European Parliament elections? Figure 3 shows the trends in the “effective number of electoral parties” in Greek, Portuguese and Spanish (legislative and EP) elections. We use the ENEP because it is the adequate indicator for long-term trends.

Comparing Portuguese legislative and EP elections in terms of the trends in the ENEP (Figure 3), we can see that there is a clear synchronicity. In both types of elections there is a majoritarian drive, with a significant reduction in the effective number of parties. Moreover, what seems to be a very slight reversal of trends in recent legislative elections (1999-2005) is also mirrored in recent European contests (1999-2004). Furthermore, we can see that European elections seem to be losing their distinctive character vis-à-vis the first-order ones. In all the elections between 1999 and 2004, the effective number of parties in the two types of elections shows only very slight differences. Whether this is an indicator of a new era in Portuguese politics is unclear. Still, in the medium/long-term, the first-order elections seem to be contaminating the European Parliamentary contests, a feature not predicted by the second-order elections theory, since this model makes longitudinal predictions. In the Spanish legislative elections, there has also been some majoritarian drive in the party system from 1989 until 2004 (see Figure 3); this drive has been mirrored in EP elections also. Moreover, in 2004 the ENEP is even lower in EP than in legislative elections.

Although the spillover of the majoritarian trend from legislative to EP elections (which we observed in Portugal and Spain) was not predicted by the second-order
elections’ model, we believe that it is a phenomenon that can nevertheless be accommodated in that theoretical framework. It might mean that first-order elections are more important, in terms of financial state resources, mass media visibility and organizational structure. Therefore, if some parties lose their force on the national level, this will tend to contaminate other levels of power (such as the European level).

Regarding the legislative elections in Greece (Figure 3), we can see that, since 1981, the variations in time for the ENEP has been minimal and political stability has been a dominant feature of the Greek party system. In terms of European elections, the picture is different because the amount of change between elections is usually much larger than in legislative elections, most probably due to a more permissive electoral system. However, despite that significant difference, in Greece (as in Portugal) the ups and downs of the ENEP in EP elections seem to follow “trends” similar to those of legislative elections. Therefore, in Greece, Portugal, and Spain there seems to be some contagion of first-order upon second-order elections, although in the former case this effect seems to be of a more short-term nature.

Let us pass to the differential performance of political parties (across types of elections) according to their size (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1985b; Marsh, 1998; Oppenhuis, Eijk and Franklin, 1996a and 1996b; Eijk, Franklin and Oppenhuis, 1996). The first hypothesis to be tested is whether or not small (the parties belonging to the “others” category in Table 1), medium-sized (the Coalition of the Left and Progress, in Greece; PCP and CDS, in Portugal) and medium/small-sized (KKE and SYN, in Greece; IU and the regionalist CiU, plus the CDS and the UCD for the 80’s, in Spain) parties have always performed better in European elections than in legislative ones. The second hypothesis to be tested is whether or not the reverse is true for the large parties (ND and PASOK; PS and PSD; PSOE and PP).
Table 1: Greek, Portuguese and Spanish Political Parties’ Average Voting Percentages by Decade in Legislative and European Parliament Elections (around here)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>Type of Elections</th>
<th>1980’s (i)</th>
<th>1990’s (i)</th>
<th>2000’s (i)</th>
<th>1980’s-2004 (i)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GREECE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND + PASOK (Large)</td>
<td>Legislative EP</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>86.2</td>
<td>84.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EP</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>74.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition (Medium)</td>
<td>Legislative EP</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EP</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KKE + SYN (Medium)</td>
<td>Legislative EP</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EP</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (Small)</td>
<td>Legislative EP</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EP</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PORTUGAL</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS+PSD (Large)</td>
<td>Legislative EP</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>72.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>71.7</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>67.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRD (Medium)</td>
<td>Legislative EP</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EP</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCP+CDS (Medium)</td>
<td>Legislative EP</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>21.1</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>21.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others (Small)</td>
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<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EP</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SPAIN</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSOE+PP (Large)</td>
<td>Legislative EP</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>74.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>62.3</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>73.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IU+CiU (Medium)</td>
<td>Legislative EP</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EP</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS + UCD (Medium)</td>
<td>Legislative EP</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EP</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (Small)</td>
<td>Legislative EP</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EP</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

(1) Political parties’ vote percentages are averages for each decade (1980, 1990, and 2000) or for the entire period (1980-2004). Only for Greece, the averages of the 1980’s include the legislative election of 15th April 1990 because the structure of the party system was identical to that of the legislative elections of 1989.

(2) The Coalition of the Left and Progress was formed in December 1988 and joined the KKE with the Greek Left (EAR), itself formed only in 1987 following the self-dissolution of the KKE-Esoterikou and its fusion with a number of small parties and personalities of the broader left (Verney, 1990). This coalition contended for political power in the legislative elections of 18th June 1989 (a time referred to as 1989a), in the concurrent European Elections, and then in the legislative elections of 5th November 1989 (referred to as 1989b), as well as in the legislative elections of 15th April 1990.

(3) For the decade of the 1980s, the average calculations include the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and the Euro-communist KKE-Esoterikou (“of the Interior”).

(4) EP 1994 – Political Spring (Politiki Anixi) 8.65%, Democratic Revival (Demokratiki Ananeosi) 2.80%. EP 1999 – Democratic Social Movement (Demokratiko Kinoniko Kinema) 6.85%, Political Spring (Politiki Anixi) 2.28%.

(5) For the legislative elections of 1982 and 1986, the party of Popular Alliance (the AP-PDP: Alianza Popular - Partido Democrata Popular) and the Popular Coalition (the AP-PDP-PL: Coalicion Popular) are calculated, respectively. For the legislative elections of 1989, the Popular Party (the PP: Partido Popular) is calculated.

(6) For the legislative elections of 1982, the Communist Party of Spain (the PCE: Partido Comunista de España) is calculated. The party of the United Left (IU: Izquierda Unida) was grounded after the legislative elections of 1982. In 2004, the Spanish parties IU and CIU both ran in coalition: the IU-ICV-EUIA and GALEUSA (the PNV-CiU-BNG), respectively. Since in the previous EP election these two parties also ran in coalition, we used the following rule to disaggregate the vote: first, we considered the total number of seats that the coalition received; second, we calculated the percentage of seats each member of the coalition received (vis-à-vis the total number of seats in the coalition); third, we used the later proportion multiplied by the total vote of the coalition to disaggregate the vote. For example, the seats in EP for IU-ICV-EUIA were 2: IU - 1 (50%); ICV – 1 (50%); EUIA – 0 (0.0%). Since the total vote for the coalition was 4.15%, we calculated the IU vote percentage as: 4.15 * 0.5 = 2.075 = 2.1

(7) The performance of the party of the Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD: Union de Centro Democratico) is calculated only for the legislative elections of 1982 in which it collapsed. The party of the Social and Democratic Centre (CDS: Centro Democratico y Social) performed as medium-small party only during the 1980’s. For the legislative elections of 1993, small parties/others are calculated.

Looking at Table 1, we can clearly see that both hypotheses receive empirical support in the Greek and Portuguese cases.\textsuperscript{ix} Therefore, in terms of the performance
of different types of Greek and Portuguese political parties, according to their size, theories about first and second-order elections always received empirical support. However, the differences are much larger in the Greek than in the Portuguese case, and this is probably due to the differences in electoral systems across types of elections in each country.

In the case of Spain, except for the decade beginning in 2000, the large parties always performed better in legislative than in EP elections. Furthermore, for this same decade, the smaller Spanish parties (“others”) always performed better in European than in legislative elections (see Table 1). In any case, the differences are very small (much lower than in both the Greek and the Portuguese cases) and are never statistically significant. Moreover, the data on the Spanish medium/small-sized parties (the IU, CiU, UCD, and CDS) does not fit the expected pattern: these parties always performed better in first-order elections than in EP elections. A tentative explanation for the deviant (or at least partially deviant) patterns in Spain is the following: except the CiU, the small/medium-sized parties (the IU, UCD, and CDS, but especially the latter two) have been losing electoral support in legislative elections since 1982 (moreover, the UCD hasn’t contested elections since 1986; the CDS has lost national parliamentary representation since 1993). This decline first took place in legislative elections but was even more pronounced later in EP contests. Thus, in the case of Spain, probably due to the long-term changes in the party system, the second-order elections theory received only very limited empirical support.

IV. The Long-Term Impact Of Voting Modes Upon The Anchors Of Partisanship

As we said before, there are three major “modes” of voting in EP elections: “voting with the head”, “voting with the heart”, and “voting with the boot”. In EP elections, most voters “vote with the head” (mirroring their voting behaviour in first-order elections). However, EP elections provide opportunities for voters to defect from the
parties they would normally vote for in legislative contests (usually either by “voting with the heart” or by “voting with the boot”).

As stated earlier, Franklin envisages two major possible effects of those opportunities for defection in EP elections. First, the use of opportunities for defection in EP elections will affect the socialization of young voters both in EP and legislative elections, as well as delay or prevent the acquisition of strong national partisanship. This effect across the board might create major difficulties for the stabilization of the political and party systems in new democracies by delaying (or even preventing) the establishment of stable patterns of voting behaviour. Second, the use of the opportunities for defection by young voters will affect their behaviour only in EP elections, thus allowing them to acquire “just as strong a partisanship in national elections as earlier cohorts of voters did. (Franklin, 2005: 7)”

Through the differential performance of the large, medium and small parties in first-order and EP elections, we have already seen that electors in new Southern European democracies do, at least apparently, use the opportunities for defection in EP elections, especially in the cases of Greece and Portugal. Of course, even leaving aside differential turnout (which might have a significant impact upon the performance of the different types of parties), those measures are at best only crude measures of defection, since they cannot take into account the vote transfers (on the individual level) that cancel each other out (and, thus, are not visible on the aggregate level). As a result, we need to evaluate the level of disloyal electoral behaviour in EP elections through the use of individual-level data.

Analyzing the level of “quasi-switching” is one way to conduct such an evaluation (it is measured by comparing the vote recall in EP elections with the voting intention in a hypothetical and concurrent national election). “To the extent that such voters (the defectors in EP elections) vote differently than they would have done in a concurrent national election they have been characterized as being engaged in ‘quasi-switching’ (Franklin, 2005: 5-6).” The expectation is the following: “we should observe increasing levels of quasi-switching as the passage of time allows voters to leave the electorate (through death and infirmity) who have
learned a more rigid habit of voting, and as the number of voters who experienced EP elections during their formative years increase (Franklin, 2005: 7).”

According to the data processed by Franklin (2005: 9), and considering only those who voted in EP elections, the levels of quasi-switching for 1989, 1994, 1999, and 2004 are the following: 8.1%, 12.4%, 9.6% and 8.6%, in Greece; 9.7%, 12.7%, 7.5% and 42.8%, in Portugal; 22.2%, 12.5%, 15.5% and 10.8%, in Spain. Except for Portugal, which has a surprisingly high level of quasi-switching in 2004, there is no general increase in the level of quasi-switching, and there are no linear trends in this respect. Thus, on the one hand, the level of quasi-switching seems to be dependent upon political conjunctures. On the other hand, the individual-level data regarding quasi-switching does reveal some propensity of voters to defect in national legislative elections. Moreover, quasi-switching can be said to be only an underestimation of disloyal electoral behaviour: voters do not experience the same level of constraints in a hypothetical national election as in a real one.

But has that apparently disloyal electoral behaviour had any impact upon legislative electoral behaviour? If so, did it have major consequences in terms of the stabilization of the political and party systems in the new Southern European democracies by delaying, or even preventing, the establishment of stable patterns of voting behaviour? To answer these questions, we will use both aggregate measures of electoral volatility and indicators of the level of social and ideological anchoring of partisanship on the individual level.

On the aggregate level, the concepts of total and inter-bloc electoral volatility will be used (Bartolini and Mair, 1990, pp. 17-52 and 313-314). Considering that second-order elections might be used by voters to express their discontent with the government in place, and considering that these elections have no direct consequences for national government formation, it is possible for voters to feel freer to change their voting options in second-order elections than in first-order ones. We expect that this might happen both in terms of vote swings within the same ideological quadrant (within-bloc volatility) and between the left-right boundary (inter-bloc volatility: BV). Note that the sum of within- and inter-bloc
volatility gives us total volatility (TV). The results in the case of Portugal (1975-2002) were deceiving: with minor exceptions, T.V. usually plays a larger role in legislative elections than in both local and EP elections, sometimes much larger; as for BV, the findings were also negative, although here the picture is a bit more mixed (Freire, 2004).

In a general comparative perspective, Greece, Portugal, and Spain do exhibit some of the most volatile elections (both in terms of TV and BV) of the Western European countries between 1945 and 2002 (Gunther, 2004: 39). This is of course an indicator of their character as new democratic regimes, within which patterns of electoral behaviour were not yet stabilized. However, after analyzing electoral volatility in each election since the first democratic contest until 2002 (Gunther, 2004: 40), we can say that EP elections have had only a minor effect, if any, upon electoral behaviour’s instability, and thus on the stabilization of each one of the three political and party systems. In terms of TV, the highest levels of volatility occurred before the first EP elections took place (and also concurrently in the Greek and the Portuguese cases: 1981 and 1987, respectively). In terms of BV, the picture is a bit more mixed but basically similar: in Greece, the highest levels of BV occurred before or concurrently with (1981) the first EP elections; in Spain, the two highest levels of BV occurred both before (1982) and after (2000) the EP elections took place; in Portugal, the two highest levels of BV occurred concurrently with (1987) and after (1995) the first EP elections. Moreover, even in the two latter cases, the highest levels of BV occurred in fully stabilized political and party systems. In any case, the major changes in the party systems took place before (or concurrently with) the first EP elections, and were related to changes in the supply-side of politics: Greece, 1981 (the collapse of the EDIK, the Union of the Democratic Centre, and the ascension of PASOK); Portugal, 1985 and 1987 (the ascension and collapse of the PRD- the Party of Democratic Renewal, and the ascension of the PSD); Spain, 1982 (with the collapse of the UCD, and the ascension of the PSOE).
Table 2: Vote in Greek EP and Legislative Elections (Logistic Regressions): Social Structure, Church Attendance, Left-Right Self-Placement, and the Vote (around here)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Legislative 2004</th>
<th>EP 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self Placement on a Left-Right Scale</td>
<td>0.5740***</td>
<td>0.7553***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.0118</td>
<td>0.0351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective Social Class</td>
<td>0.4217**</td>
<td>0.3062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Membership</td>
<td>-0.7188</td>
<td>-0.7553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church Attendance</td>
<td>-0.1447</td>
<td>0.1770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R² (Nagelkerke)</td>
<td>47.4%</td>
<td>59.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid N</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: data elaborated by the authors from the European Election Study 2004.

Notes:
1) Dependent variable: vote in EP or Legislative election recoded as left (0) and right (1). The positioning of the parties in terms of left and right was done using electors’ perceptions of parties’ locations on the left-right scale.
2) Independent variables:
   a) self-placement on a left (1) –right (10) scale;
   b) education: age when voter stopped studying (years old);
   c) subjective social class: from “working class” (1) to “upper class” (5);
   d) union membership: 0 – no; 1 – yes (the respondent, someone in his household or both);
   e) church attendance: from “never” (1) to “several times a week” (5).
   f) *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
   g) due to differential turnout, only those who also voted in EP elections were included for the legislative elections.
Table 3: Vote in Portuguese EP and Legislative Elections (Logistic Regressions): Social Structure, Church Attendance, Left-Right Self-Placement, and the Vote (around here)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Legislative 2002</th>
<th>EP 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self Placement on a Left-Right Scale</td>
<td>0.5340***</td>
<td>0.3590***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.0025</td>
<td>0.0008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective Social Class</td>
<td>0.2237</td>
<td>0.2195*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Membership</td>
<td>-0.5124</td>
<td>-0.5527*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective Church Attendance</td>
<td>0.0449</td>
<td>0.1631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R² (Nagelkerke)</td>
<td>45.3%</td>
<td>31.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid N</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: see Table 2.

Notes: see Table 2; for the 2002 legislative elections, only individuals 21 years old or older were considered (because the survey was fielded in 2004).
Table 4: Vote in Spanish EP and Legislative Elections (Logistic Regressions): Social Structure, Church Attendance, Left-Right Self-Placement, and the Vote (around here)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Legislative 2004</th>
<th>EP 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self Placement on a Left-Right Scale</td>
<td>1.9287***</td>
<td>1.6774***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.0101</td>
<td>0.0153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective Social Class</td>
<td>0.0451</td>
<td>-0.0979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Membership</td>
<td>0.1634</td>
<td>-0.2516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church Attendance</td>
<td>0.5535**</td>
<td>0.4924**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R² (Nagelkerke)</td>
<td>82.8%</td>
<td>78.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>1208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid N</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>526</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: see Table 2.

Notes: see Table 2.

Of course, aggregate volatility is only a very crude measure of electoral change, in that it may sometimes represent very understated values for shifts in individual-level political preferences: there may be many voting shifts that cancel each other out. That is why we will also use the level of anchoring of a vote’s anchorage in social and ideological factors as an additional measure of the propensity to defect in national and EP elections.

We will test to see whether or not the social and ideological anchors of partisanship are weaker in second-order elections than in first-order ones, thus indicating a greater probability of vote shifts between left and right in second-order elections. Because we want to test the electors’ propensity to cross the left-right divide, in Tables 2, 3, and 4, we use the vote for parties of the left (0) and the right
(1) as our dependent variable, both in legislative and EP elections. Note that only those individuals who voted in the 2004 EP elections are included in any equation. The independent variables are: 1) several indicators of the social anchors of partisanship (see notes in Table 2), and 2) left-right self-placement. Since the dependent variable is a dichotomy, we will be using logistic regressions.

The results in Tables 2, 3, and 4 reveal that sometimes the vote is more anchored in EP than in legislative elections (Greece); sometimes, however, it is the other way around (Portugal and Spain). Only for Greece and Portugal (Freire and Teperoglou, 2005), we made the same comparisons between legislative and EP elections for an extensive period (for Portugal, 1987-2004 and for Greece, 1985-2004), and concluded the following: “the individual level evidence allows us to infer that sometimes people are more prone to change their vote across party/ideological blocs in European elections than in legislative ones; on other occasions, the reverse is true. Therefore, it can be ascertained that the phenomena is mainly dependent upon the political conjuncture.”

As a result, we must conclude the following. First, the levels of defection are not necessarily higher in EP than in legislative elections, because the levels of defection are dependent upon the political conjuncture in any type of election. Second, the highest levels of defection regarding legislative elections in the three new Southern European democracies began before (or concurrently with) the first EP elections; consequently, the latter elections couldn’t have had any significant effect upon that disloyal electoral behaviour on the national level. Third, EP elections have had only a minor effect, if any, upon the instability of legislative electoral behaviour and thus, they had only a minor effect, if any, on the stabilization of the political and party systems in each one of the three countries.

V. European Elections And Electoral Cycles

The hypothesis to be tested in this section is whether or not European elections are used by electors as a way to express content or discontent with national
government (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1985a and 1985b; Oppenhuis, Eijk and Franklin, 1996; Eijk, Franklin and Oppenhuis, 1996; Marsh, 1998). This will be done by comparing aggregate electoral results across legislative and EP elections during different periods of the national electoral cycle, and using as a baseline the governmental parties’ vote share in the previous (or concurrent) first-order election (Figure 4). The same hypothesis will also be tested through OLS regressions (Table 5).

Sources: see Figure 1 above.
Note: for the government parties’ vote shares, we considered only those parties with posts in the cabinet (even if the party or parties in government were receiving extra parliamentary support from other parties).
### Table 5: Statistical Testing of the Electoral Cycle in Greece, Portugal, and Spain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Population</th>
<th>Constant</th>
<th>Cycle</th>
<th>Cycle*Cycle</th>
<th>R sq</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece, Portugal, and Spain</td>
<td>-3.110**</td>
<td>-0.432**</td>
<td>+0.005**</td>
<td>0.241</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>-3.119</td>
<td>-0.348</td>
<td>+0.004</td>
<td>0.376</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>-12.741</td>
<td>-0.443**</td>
<td>+0.006**</td>
<td>0.954</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>+4.860</td>
<td>-0.644*</td>
<td>+0.007*</td>
<td>0.811</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** For Spain, we used only the difference between the vote received by the party in government and its support in the next EP election (as in Figure 4).


Before proceeding with the analysis three major issues must be clarified. First, the dependent variable is the difference between the vote percentage for the party (or parties) that control the national government between the prior (or concurrent) first-order elections (legislative) and the subsequent (or concurrent) second-order election (European) (Marsh, 1998; Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1985a and 1985b).

Second, the notion of the electoral cycle is related to the idea that, during any national government’s existence, there are popularity cycles with differential political consequences depending on the time elapsed between the first-order and the second-order elections (Marsh, 1998; Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1985a and 1985b; Eijk, Franklin, Oppenhuis, 1996; Oppenhuis, Eijk, and Franklin, 1996). Some authors use continuous measurements for the electoral cycle variable (Marsh, 1998), and that is what we will do as well: that measurement will be the percentage of the national election cycle that passed since the last first-order election, vis-à-vis the entire term (48 months in any one of the three countries). This is the variable...
represented by the $x$-axis in Figure 4, and it is one of our independent variables in Table 5: namely, “cycle” (the other independent variable in this Table is “cycle” $\times$ “cycle”, an indicator designed to express a quadratic function). Our dependent variable was already defined, and it will be used not only in the regression equations (Table 5), but also for graphical representation by the $y$-axis in Figure 4.

Third, what are the expected political consequences for national governments in EP elections that take place during different phases of the national electoral cycle, in terms of citizens’ electoral behaviour? For the “midterm” period (within 13-36 months of the national electoral cycle, for our purposes) there is a solid consensus in the literature, with most of the authors considering that governmental parties will tend to lose vote share in second-order elections (Marsh, 1998; Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1985a and 1985b; Eijk, Franklin, Oppenhuis, 1996; Oppenhuis, Eijk, and Franklin, 1996). In terms of the honeymoon period (usually within 12 months), some authors defend that national governments will receive greater or near identical support in second-order elections as compared to first-order ones (Marsh, 1998; Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1985a and 1985b). Others defend that, since second-order elections that take place during the honeymoon period have hardly any consequences for national governments, voters here will tend to cast “sincere votes” (i.e., “vote with the heart”) (Eijk, Franklin, Oppenhuis, 1996; Oppenhuis, Eijk, and Franklin, 1996). Therefore, larger parties in government and the opposition will tend to lose vote share to smaller parties in multiparty systems. Finally, the later term period (37-48 months, for our purposes) consists for some authors of a certain recovery in national government popularity, and so parties controlling national cabinets will tend to lose less votes than in midterm elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1985a and 1985b). However, others defend that, since second-order elections tend to better fulfill their function as markers of public opinion regarding support for government the closer they fall to the next first-order election (later term), voters will tend to cast more “protest votes” in those periods (i.e., “vote with the boot”) (Eijk, Franklin, Oppenhuis, 1996; Oppenhuis, Eijk, and Franklin, 1996). Therefore, according to these authors, parties in control of
government will also tend to lose votes in second-order elections if they take place in the later term of the national cycle.

Looking at Figure 4, we can see that one of the hypothesized differences between European and national elections (i.e., the losses of place for the national government’s parties), is confirmed in almost all EP elections for the three countries. However, the magnitude of the losses in Greece and in Spain is usually rather more limited compared to Portugal. The two cases where there is no loss but, instead, a very slight increase in the vote for the parties in national government occur, as expected, during the honey-moon period (Spain 2004: +0.87%) or in the later-term period (Spain 1999: +0.95%). Regardless of the timing of the EP elections, all the Greek European contests do show anti-government swings.

As the data in Figure 4 shows, in Greece, Portugal, and Spain (except for 2004), all EP elections that took place during the government’s honeymoon period (within 25% of the national electoral cycle: seven elections, after excluding 2004 in Spain) represented voting losses for the incumbents. Moreover, in the case of the 1994 EP elections in Greece (-9.23%) and Spain (-7.99%) national government’s punishment was even greater than in any one of the EP elections which took place in the mid-term in these two countries. The losses of the incumbents during the honeymoon period might of course be due to the effect of the “sincere vote”. But there is at least one more possibility: Brody (1991: 27-46) discovered that US Presidents (from Eisenhower, 1953, to Bush, 1989) that were in their second-term had no true honey-moon in terms of popularity trends during the first seven months in office. This is probably an important factor that contributed to incumbents’ voting losses in EP elections that took place during the honey-moon period: in Greece, 1989 and 1994 (PASOK’s second and third term, respectively), in Portugal, 1987 (the PSD’s second term), and in Spain, 1987 and 1994 (the PSOE’s second and third term, respectively). It is especially relevant in this respect that the incumbent’s huge losses in 1994 took place during the third term for both PASOK and the PSOE.

Finally, let us pass to the statistical testing of the electoral cycle’s effects (see also Schmitt, 2005). By regressing “the difference in the government party’s vote share”
(between the first-order and the subsequent, or concurrent, EP election) based on the “percentage of national electoral cycle since the last first-order election”, for the three countries, we can see that the predictions of the second-order election model are realized: the incumbents do lose votes in EP elections. Moreover, a quadratic function (“cycle * cycle”) does fit the data: the losses are higher in the mid-term than in the honey-moon or in the later-term periods. Looking at each country separately, in Portugal the regression performs almost identical results, while for Spain the statistical testing is also highly successful. Comparing Greece with the other two countries, the difference is discernible: the cyclical element is actually weaker, and it is not statistically significant. This result is probably due to the fact that Greece had so many EP elections in the honey-moon period (four in a total of six), and that two of them took place after the incumbent’s first term in office.

**CONCLUSIONS**

On April 25th, 1974, Portugal initiated the so-called “third-wave” of world-wide democratisation (Huntington, 1993). Greece (November 1974) and Spain (1975) soon joined that trend. Thus, the three countries share an authoritarian heritage, which is much longer in the cases of Portugal and Spain than in the case of Greece. Moreover, between seven and ten years after their first democratic elections, each one of these three countries held their first EP election. Since 1981/87, six (Greece) or five (Portugal and Spain) EP elections took place in each one of the three countries. Thus, our main research question was the following: what lessons can be learned from the longitudinal (1981/87-2004) and the comparative study of European elections in the new Southern European democracies of Greece, Portugal, and Spain, regarding the inter-relations of voting behaviour in first (legislative) and second-order (European) elections, both for consolidating and established democracies?. More specifically, what lessons from this study can be learned for the eight post-communist democracies that joined the European Union in 2004?

In terms of the short- and long-term impacts of national factors upon voting behaviour in EP elections, several conclusions are worth mentioning. In Greece,
Portugal, and Spain, the second-order election model does serve to explain the relations between national factors and EP elections. First, with the partial exception of Spain, political parties do perform differently in legislative and EP elections: the large parties perform better in first-order than in EP elections; for the medium, medium/small, and small-sized parties, the reverse is true. Even the partial exception in Spain was explained by the impact of national factors upon EP elections: the long-term decline of medium/small-sized parties (the PCE/IU, and the CDS) on the national level was delayed and strengthened on the second-order level. Moreover, the small-sized but highly significant Spanish regionalist parties are benefited by the legislative electoral system, due to their vote concentration in regional terms, and this factor is not present in EP elections (in fact, quite the contrary). Second, the national incumbents do lose votes in EP elections, especially if those elections take place in the mid-term of the electoral cycle. However, those losses can also be relevant during the honeymoon period if the party (or parties) that support the national government in place are not in their first term.

Schmitt (2005) found a different picture for the eight post-communist consolidating democracies that in 2004 participated for the first time in the EP elections: firstly, party system format was not significantly different in legislative and EP elections; secondly, no electoral cycle effect was found. What are the reasons for these differences between the post-communist consolidating democracies and the group consisting of Greece, Portugal, and Spain? The first point is that we must be cautious in making this comparison, because there has only been one EP election for the former set of countries. Bearing this in mind, we can nevertheless point to the different level of party system institutionalisation in Southern Europe and in Central Eastern Europe as an explanation that needs to be further developed in future studies: by the time of the first EP election, levels of party system institutionalisation were significantly higher in the former set of countries than in the latter.

Perhaps the major lesson, however, from the study of the three Southern European democracies regarding the impact of national factors upon European voting behaviour is that such an impact has not only a short-term, but also a long-
term nature. Comparing legislative and EP elections in terms of the trends of the “effective number of electoral parties” (ENEP) we concluded that, for both Portugal and Spain, the majoritarian drive in the party system during legislative elections, in force since the end of the eighties/beginning of the nineties, is also mirrored in the European contests. Furthermore, European elections seem to be losing their distinctive character vis-à-vis first-order elections: the differences in the ENEP are fading in both countries.

In the Greek legislative elections after 1981, the variations in time for the ENEP are minimal, and political stability is a dominant feature of the party system. However, in Greece (as in Portugal) the ups and downs of the ENEP in EP elections seem to follow “trends” similar to those of legislative elections. Therefore, in Greece, Portugal, and Spain, there seems to be some contagion of second-order elections on the part of first-order elections, although in the former case this effect seems to be of a more short-term nature.

Although the spillover of the majoritarian trend from legislative to EP elections that we observed in Portugal and Spain was not predicted by the second-order election model, we believe that it is a phenomenon that can nevertheless be accommodated in that theoretical framework: if some parties lose their force in the more important political arena (the national level), this will tend to contaminate other levels of power (European). Thus, we believe that future studies regarding second-order elections should investigate this long-term impact of national factors upon EP elections in more countries, namely in terms of party system format.

In terms of the lessons (both for established and consolidating democracies, but especially for the latter) regarding the long-term impact of voting behaviour in EP elections upon national electoral politics, we derive three major conclusions. First, the levels of defection are not necessarily higher in EP than in legislative elections, because in any case they are dependent upon the political conjunctures. Second, the highest levels of defection in legislative elections in Greece, Portugal, and Spain began before (or concurrently with) the first EP elections; consequently, the latter elections couldn’t have had any significant effect upon that disloyal electoral
behaviour on the national level. Third, EP elections have had only a minor effect, if any, upon the instability of legislative electoral behaviour, and thus they have had only a minor effect, if any, upon the stabilization of the political and party systems in each one of these three countries.

Thus, there are basically two lessons from the lessons from the present study about the long-term impact of voting behaviour in EP elections upon national electoral politics. First, for both established and consolidating democracies, what we discovered is that the second-order nature of the EP basically means that national factors impact EP elections, and not so much the other way around. However, this conclusion clearly needs to be further investigated in more countries. Second, the major lesson for (the eight post-communist) consolidating democracies is good news: due to their second-order nature, EP elections don’t seem to have much of an effect upon disloyal behaviour in legislative elections, nor therefore upon the disturbance of the stability or upon the institutionalisation of the political and party systems in new democracies. However, these effects were explored in new democracies that, by the time of their first EP elections, had already had a nearly fully stabilized party system. The effects of EP voting behaviour upon legislative elections might, though, be different in polities where the party system is not yet (fully) stabilized. Thus, further investigation into this issue will be needed.
Bibliographic References


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i Regarding the definition of the “effective threshold” see Lijphart, 1994: 45-46 and 63-70. We can, however, try to summarize the idea by saying that the higher the “effective threshold”, the more difficult it is for smaller parties to achieve representation, and the higher the benefit for larger parties in terms of the conversion of votes into seats; the lower the “effective threshold”, the more the reverse applies for both characteristics.

ii The “effective number of parties” (electoral, ENEP, or parliamentary, ENPP) measure is taken from Laakso and Taagepera (1979), and was calculated by the authors using official electoral data.

iii We should bear in mind that the reduction in party fragmentation made by any electoral system is also dependent upon the level of party system fragmentation itself, as well as on the geographical distribution of the vote, and not only on the mechanics of the electoral system. That is why, between the seventies and the mid-nineties, the Spanish system experienced a greater reduction than that of Greece; it also explains the convergence since the mid-nineties.

iv The Greek party system is characterized by three main and clearly separated political camps, which have figured in the interplay of two historical conflicts of 20th century Greek history: the “national schism” and the Civil War (1946-49). On the eve of the dictatorship, in 1967, three parties dominated the political arena: the National Radical Union (the ERE, representing the right); the Centre Union (the EK, representing the center); and the United Democratic Left (the EDA, representing the left). The post–1974 Greek party system has remained essentially intact: the ND represents the new right; PASOK, the new centre (namely the centre-left); and the traditional Left has been split between the orthodox Communist party of Greece (the KKE) and the Euro-communist KKE-Esoterikou (“of the Interior”). The Coalition of the Left and Progress (the SYN/Synaspismos) was founded in 1992 after the break-up of the earlier electoral coalition of the same name and represents the so-called “renewed left”. It is a political tendency that emerged from the KKE-Esoterikou.

v However, in order to trace the evolution of each one of the four major Portuguese parties, and to compare the performance of large and medium/small-sized parties across different types of elections in both countries, we pinpoint the following rules concerning the decomposing of the votes in the Portuguese coalitions. First, we calculated the average vote percentage of each party (the PSD, CDS,
and PPM) in the elections before (1976) and after (1983) the coalition period. Second, we added these three averages together and determined the proportion of this total vote for each party of the coalition. Third, we used this proportion to determine the voting percentage of each party in 1979 and 1980, by multiplying the proportion mentioned above by the coalition’s total vote in each election. These procedures were used with the data presented in Figures 2 and 3, as well as in Table 1. In EP elections similar procedures were also used. Note that in the 2004 EP elections in Portugal, the calculations to decompose the votes in the PSD- (CDS-) PP coalition (Força Portugal) considered only the prior EP electoral results (1999), because when this article was being written, the 2004 EP election was the latest one.

Besides the ones referred to in the previous note, there were other (small and/or persistent) pre-electoral coalitions, but we counted them as single parties.

It is important to mention that the number of parties contesting each one of the two types of elections (legislative and EP) has been very similar in Greece and Portugal. The same cannot be said about Spain: the absolute number of parties contesting elections has usually been much higher in legislative than in EP elections. This difference is due in small part to the fact that the small (usually regionalist) and medium/small-sized parties have usually run in coalition for the EP elections, but not (as often) in the legislative contests. However, if we consider only the relevant parties/coalitions (with at least one seat in Parliament and/or 1% of the vote on the national level) the number of parties contesting each one of the two types of elections was also very similar in Spain, although it was still a bit higher in legislative elections.

The latter difference might be partly due to the fact that in EP elections the small (and the medium/small-sized) parties have usually run in coalition, but they don’t do so as often nor as extensively in the legislative elections. This phenomenon was perhaps even accentuated in the 2004 elections because of the reduction of the number of Spanish MEPs. However, this factor does not explain the trend in ENEP because there was also a significant majoritarian trend in both types of elections when we consider the “Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties/ENPP” (Lobo, 2005: 30). The ENPP (i.e., the index being calculated using the seats for each party, and not based upon parties’ or coalitions’ share of the vote) was the following: for the legislative elections of 1989, 1993, 1996, 2000, and 2004: 2.9, 2.7, 2.7, 2.5 and 2.5, respectively; for the EP elections of 1987, 1989, 1994, 1999, and 2004: 3.2, 3.6, 3.0, 3.1 and 2.4. Thus, we can also say that in 2004, in terms of the ENPP, the number was lower in EP than in legislative elections (for the first time since 1987).

The appropriate tests (t-test for paired samples) revealed that the differences in party performance are always significant, although to a higher extent in the case of Greece (see Freire and Teperoglou, 2005).