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The Europeanization of national foreign policy: a case study of Portugal's relations with Mozambique

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Abstract

After its transition to democracy and decolonization in the mid-1970s, Portugal's main external focus shifted from Africa and the Atlantic to Europe. Yet past priorities continued to occupy an important place in the foreign policy of this small state. Drawing on the literature on Europeanization, this paper examines the impact of European Union membership on Portuguese foreign policy by focusing on the case of Mozambique, one of Portugal's largest former colonies in sub-Saharan Africa. Pointing to some national adaptation, the findings highlight Lisbon's important efforts to project its priorities onto the EU level and preserve some freedom of maneuver in relation to its ex-colony. This study brings a more in-depth and nuanced picture of the EU's impact on Portuguese foreign policy than the one usually found in the existing literature. Moreover, it corroborates the usefulness of the concept of Europeanization to explore the specific European dynamics that influence and shape the national foreign policies of EU member states.

Keywords: Europeanization, foreign policy, small states, post-colonial relations, Portugal, European Union, Mozambique

Introduction

Following Portugal's regime change and decolonization in the mid-1970s Europe came to occupy a more central place in the country's foreign policy outlook. Indeed, the Atlantic and colonial orientation of the long-lived authoritarian *Estado Novo* was shifted under democratic and post-Imperial Portugal to a novel emphasis on the process of European integration (see Rato, 2008; Teixeira, 2003). This development was concretely translated in the country's full accession to the European Communities (EC) in 1986 and in the committed participation that in general Lisbon subsequently came to have in that regional grouping. Yet, in the context of the broad Euro-Atlantic consensus that crystallized domestically, areas of traditional interest continued to occupy an important role for the country's foreign policy, even if under new lines. Concurrently, since the European Political Cooperation (EPC) was introduced in 1970, there has been significant development regarding foreign policy cooperation at the European level. Principally after the end of the Cold War, the European Union (EU) has gradually reinforced its aspirations as an international actor, including in the "sensitive" domain of security and defense (see Howorth, 2007; Peterson, 2008). This level of ambition was reflected in the institutionalization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1993, which mechanisms and instruments have contributed to increase the Union's international activity. Although CFSP has remained one the less integrated policy areas, the EU's external action tends to combine different instruments, some of them with more supranational features. Considering these parallel trends, this paper aims at assessing, in an exploratory manner, the impact of EU membership on Portuguese foreign policy. While references to the "Europeanization" of Portugal's foreign policy are frequent, the literature that deals directly with the issue is scarce. Most contributions focus on the general participation of Portugal in European foreign policy, neglecting the *problématique* of the impact such involvement may have on national policy.² When that issue is expressly dealt with the approach tends to be very general

² Among the main contributions in that regard are: Algieri and Regelsberger (1996), Vasconcelos (1996), Vasconcelos and Seabra (2000), Matos Correia (2002, 2006), Gaspar (2000, 2007), Ferreira-Pereira (2007).

and unsystematic (see Magone, 2000, 2004, 2006; Moita, 2007). In order to better examine the EU's influence on Portuguese foreign policy, this paper makes an explicit use of the "Europeanization" concept.

Initially developed for communitarized areas of the EU, the concept of Europeanization has been increasingly applied to the essentially intergovernmental realm of foreign policy (see e.g. Graziano and Vink, 2008; Ladrech, 2010; Wong and Hill, 2011). In a frequently used conceptualization, foreign policy Europeanization is defined along three interrelated dimensions: "national adaptation", "national projection" and "identity reconstruction" (Wong, 2005, 2008). The first dimension refers mainly to changes in national structures and processes due to EU demands, which become an increasingly important point of reference for national actors. While filtered by national variables, that adaptational pressure from the EU acts as a constraint on member states. The main indicators of that process are the salience of the European agenda at the national level, the adherence to common objectives, and the relaxation of traditional national positions to accommodate the progress of EU initiatives. The second dimension relates to the projection of national preferences and ideas to the European level. Member states "Europeanize" what were previously national priorities in order to benefit from the advantages of a joint action. This can be observed in the attempts by member states to increase their international influence by promoting common policies, as well as in their use of the EU as a "cover" for national positions or to influence the foreign policies of other EU members. Finally, the third dimension centers on the process of identity and interest redefinition in the EU context. Frequent interactions among national and European policy-makers generate processes of social learning and socialization, which in turn favor the perception of common interests. Some of the principal indicators in this case are the emergence of shared values and norms among decision-making elites in relation to international issues, the presence of shared definitions of European and national interests, and the existence of reflexes of coordination. Based on this conceptualization, the general question that structures the analysis is: to what extent has Portuguese foreign policy been Europeanized? Four main sub-questions are also considered: (i) whether Portugal has adapted to EU positions; (ii) whether it has tried to expand and influence joint actions; (iii) whether

Portuguese foreign policy elites “think” increasingly in European terms; (iv) and whether Lisbon has favored other bilateral or multilateral channels, over available EU options.

For a more in-depth analysis the paper centers on Portugal’s relationship with Mozambique. The focus is on political-diplomatic issues, but attention is also given to linkages with other policy domains. Similarly to the other Portuguese-speaking countries, Mozambique is part of one of the main pillars of Portugal’s foreign policy. Grounded in historical and cultural ties, their post-colonial relations are seen by Lisbon as significant in themselves, but also considering the value they can add to the other dimensions of its external action. After decolonization, the reconstruction and reinforcement of the bilateral relationship between Lisbon and Maputo went slowly due to numerous difficulties, including post-colonial tensions and suspicions. Yet over time important steps were given, namely in a multilateral setting, which gradually contributed to the current solid and close connection between the two countries (see Cravinho, 2005; Norrie MacQueen, 1997; Venâncio and Chan, 1996). In turn, the EU has had long and highly institutionalized relations with sub-Saharan Africa, but the sub-region has not been among its top foreign policy priorities. Marked by the historical legacies of some of its member states, those relations have traditionally privileged economic dimensions (development and trade issues), rather than more openly political-diplomatic aspects. However, since the 1990s the Union has tried to adopt a more coordinated approach towards Africa, and its objectives for this geographical area became more “politicized” (see Carbone, 2010; Holland, 2002). From that same period, the return of peace and increased political stability in Mozambique attracted greater EU attention. The fact that the relationship with Mozambique is significant both for Portugal and the EU justifies to a great extent the choice of this case study. This option has the additional interest of intersecting two important dimensions of Portuguese foreign policy, i.e. Europe and Africa.³ In view of the limited scholarship on the topic, the analysis that follows is based to a large measure on

³ A recent review of the literature on contemporary Portuguese foreign policy has precisely emphasised the lack of studies examining in detail Portugal’s relations with Africa in multilateral *fora* (Freire and Brito, 2010: 176).

primary sources, including interviews conducted in Lisbon, Brussels and London.

The paper proceeds in four steps. In the first section, the analysis focuses on Portugal's accession negotiations to the European Communities, which formally lasted from 1978 until 1985. During accession talks the EU can exert a strong influence on candidate states due to the desire of the latter to become members and the strict conditions attached to membership, more specifically the need to adopt the *acquis communautaire*. The emphasis here is on the *acquis politique* related to Mozambique. In the second section, the attention moves to Portugal's participation in the peace process negotiations in Mozambique, whose direct talks ran from 1990 to 1992. This was the most important political event to occur in Mozambique after Portugal's EC accession and still under EPC. The third section deals with Portugal's involvement in electoral processes in Mozambique, more precisely the presidential and legislative elections of 1994, 1999 and 2004. As general elections they represented important political moments and the choice made here, among the many elections held since independence, gives enough variety in terms of stages in the country's democratization process. To explain, while the first democratic elections in 1994 were considered a "success" by the international community, in the context of the 2004 vote the EU was more critical than ever before. Moreover, all those elections took place after the CFSP was launched and EU observers were sent to monitor them. Finally, the paper closes with some conclusions.

1. Portugal's EC accession and the *acquis* on Mozambique

When Portugal began to negotiate its accession to the European Communities, in the late 1970s, its relationship with Mozambique was far from easy. Following the collapse of the Caetano regime and decolonization, Portugal was interested in rebuilding on a new basis its historical ties with its ex-colony. Yet considering the instability and difficulties that Portugal went through until the mid-1980s, the precise definition of what that post-colonial policy should be was far from established. Moreover, the existence of unresolved disputes (*contenciosos*), the civil war in Mozambique, and the different orientation

Lisbon and Maputo came to adopt in the Cold War brought further challenges to an already sensitive bilateral relationship. In this context, Portugal's policy instruments were unsurprisingly limited and very often ineffective. In the early 1980s some improvements took place, but the bilateral relationship remained complicated and somewhat distant. Throughout this pre-accession phase, the *acquis communautaire* in the field of foreign policy was the European Political Cooperation. EPC was a loose framework for foreign policy cooperation oriented by broad interests rather than by clearly articulated goals. This was particularly the case in relation to Africa as despite a declared common interest to reinforce "long-standing links" some member states remained very jealous of their national prerogatives towards former colonies. The EC members had committed themselves to regular consultations, coordination of national positions and, where "possible and desirable", common action. But EPC remained entirely intergovernmental and was kept rigidly separated from the EC legal framework. While habits of cooperation among member states were fostered, the output of EPC was essentially declaratory. Considering this general background, what was the impact of Portugal's EC accession process on its relations with Mozambique?

Adapting to a weak, but potentially useful acquis

Over the period of Portugal's EC accession negotiations, the EPC *acquis* on Mozambique was not very substantial. Concerned about growing Soviet influence in southern Africa, in 1975 the EC member states had collectively recognized the independence of Mozambique and expressed their willingness to see the new African country join the Lomé Convention. The following year, the Nine issued a statement setting out their policy towards southern Africa as a whole. Among other aspects, the document rejected "any action by any State aimed at setting up a sphere of influence in Africa" and condemned the policy of Apartheid in South Africa (Hill and Smith, 2000: 399; Nuttall, 1992: 127-30). In the face of South African military raids in Angola and Mozambique, in 1981 the Dutch Presidency released a press statement deploring the violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of those countries (Conseil Européen, 1981). Subsequently, with Mozambique's decision to join Lomé (achieved in late 1984), relations between Brussels and Maputo gradually became closer. Those

developments were largely in tune with the pro-Western and European orientation, which had by then become dominant in Lisbon (Teixeira, 2003: 114-5). By and large, also Portugal was interested in lessening Soviet influence in the sub-region and supporting the sovereignty of its ex-colonies (Figueiredo, 1986: 100). The more openly critical stance of some EC countries vis-à-vis the segregationist South African regime was possibly less welcome in some Portuguese quarters. But, as put by a former Portuguese ambassador, “EPC declarations were not a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States”. In that context, the same source added that in any case “the spoilers were already in” (most probably referring to Britain, among others).⁴ The content and limitations of the EPC *acquis* related to Mozambique were, therefore, not likely to pose many constraints on Portuguese interests. That picture contrasted with the new opportunities EC membership promised to create for Portugal’s meager and problematic relations with Mozambique, as well as for its overall foreign policy. In fact, for Portugal’s main political forces EC accession had become a top priority in order to support the stabilization and modernization of the nascent democracy, as well as the redefinition of its international orientation (Pinto and Teixeira, 2004: 122-4). That same political elite dominated Portugal’s accession negotiations, where the “external relations” chapter was fairly easy to close (Dinan, 2004: 184; Marta, 1985).⁵ Ultimately, the *acquis politique* was part of the conditions Lisbon had necessarily to accept in order to become a Community member.

Although the “European option” was a priority, throughout the pre-accession period Portugal continued to promote initiatives in relation to its former African colonies. Mainly from the late 1970s, Portuguese authorities (both the Presidency and the different governments) sought to improve the country’s post-colonial relations (see Norman MacQueen, 1985; Venâncio and Chan, 1996). The EC appears to have added a further impulse to Portugal’s *rapprochement* with its ex-colonies. Since the beginning of Portugal’s accession process, Brussels had pointed out the potential utility of Lisbon’s historical links, in Africa and other continents, for the international role of the Community (European Commission, 1978: 7). Moreover, as the EC and its member states

⁴ Interview by the author (Brussels, February 2011).

⁵ Interview by the author with former Portuguese politician (Lisbon, October 2010).

were interested in strengthening their relations with the Front-Line States (particularly with Angola and Mozambique, then still outside Lomé), Portugal increasingly linked strong ties with its ex-colonies to a reinforcement of its own position within the Community (Antunes, 1990: 115-7; Venâncio and Chan, 1996: 45). In general, Portugal's initiatives in Africa were meant to be "compatible" with the country's new international orientation, including the objective of EC membership.⁶ But considering the political instability and uncertainties in Portugal at the time, that broad understanding incorporated many domestic nuances (see Gaspar, 1988). In any case, it was clear that Portugal wanted to preserve a "voice" in relation to its former colonies, including vis-à-vis Mozambique. A good illustration of that took place under the *Bloco Central* coalition government. It consisted in Portugal's mediation role in the context of the "Nkomati Pact", signed by Mozambique and South Africa in March 1984.⁷ Portugal's stake in the agreement was justified on the basis of the safety of the Portuguese community in South Africa, as well as the losses that the instability was causing to the Portuguese State by affecting the operation of the Cahora Bassa dam (Figueiredo, 1986: 96; MacDonald, 1993: 113-4). With Nkomati, for the first time since 1975 Lisbon's diplomacy played an active role in the politics of the region (Gaspar, 1988: 62). That role appears to have been conducted in coordination with Washington, who had a key involvement in the process exerting pressure on both sides to negotiate and providing assistance to Mozambique (Antunes, 1990: 123-5; Hall and Young, 1997: 146-9; Newitt, 2002: 213). On the European side, a statement released by the French Presidency at the beginning of 1984 welcomed the "understanding" between Pretoria and Maputo, but without specifying the role of the external mediation (European Commission, 1984: 95). Eventually the pact collapsed and so did Portugal's attempt as a regional mediator. Among the reasons pointed out for Lisbon's failure were internal Portuguese divisions, lack of resources, and regional conditions beyond control (Gaspar, 1988: 65). EC membership arguably presented itself as potentially useful to help overcome some of those shortcomings.

⁶ Interviews by the author with former Portuguese politician (Lisbon, October 2010), and former Portuguese ambassador (Brussels, February 2011).

⁷ This non-aggression pact aimed at preventing Mozambique from supporting the African National Congress (ANC), on the one hand, and South Africa from supplying the RENAMO, on the other.

While Portugal's intentions to play a specific role in Europe-Africa relations became visible early on, it was only in the final stages of Lisbon's EC accession negotiations that such claims gained more ground and clarity. Following a senior Portuguese diplomat, from the closing phase of the accession process Portugal started to consider what would be its distinctive "mark" within the EC in the domain of foreign policy.⁸ In the context of Euro-Africa relations, in particular, the role Portugal envisaged for itself was that of a "privileged interlocutor" (Gama, 1985: 312). Through accession Portugal could join the group of member states with historical links to Africa (such as France and the United Kingdom) and make a valid contribution to closer ties between the two continents.⁹ Under its new status, Portugal would be well positioned to particularly favor its former African colonies, which by the mid-1980s were almost all part of the Lomé Convention.¹⁰ By acting this way, Lisbon would be simultaneously benefiting its own national position. This idea of reciprocal advantages was explicitly conveyed in a public statement produced in January 1985 by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jaime Gama:

"Portugal's integration in the European communities will provide Europe with the Portuguese sensibility to African problems and will give Portugal the support of community mechanisms to expand its African vocation. As a result, it will also provide Portuguese-speaking African countries with an ally and a friend within the community structures, balancing the game of influences which has been conducted there by other linguistic areas" (Gama, 1985: 251).

Although national and European objectives are depicted in that quotation as complementary, the specificities of Portugal's position and the sort of role it intended to play within the EC are also emphasized. A similar perspective was echoed by the national platform of non-governmental organizations (NGO), set up in March 1985 - just a few days before the conclusion of Portugal's EC accession negotiations - and whose first director happened to be a Portuguese diplomat. In its original protocol, the Portuguese platform endorsed the vision and goals of other international NGOs and stated a

⁸ Interview by the author with Portuguese diplomat (Lisbon, October 2010).

⁹ Interview by the author with Portuguese diplomat (Lisbon, October 2010).

¹⁰ Angola was the last former Portuguese colony in Africa to join the Lomé Convention, in April 1985.

preference for collaborating with European organizations and institutions. But it also noted that since “Portugal is the matrix of many of the values that shaped the national feeling of Lusophone countries”, the Portuguese NGOs had a “special vocation” for working with those same countries (Plataforma, 1985). The fact that in matters related to Africa (and Latin America) Lisbon had an anticipated participation in EPC, represented already a certain recognition of Portugal’s potential as an “interlocutor” (Proença, 1988; Vasconcelos, 1991: 130). More specifically on Mozambique, despite the expectations of greater cooperation generated by the “EC factor”, the failure of Nkomati in late 1984 revived some of the traditional hostility to Portugal on the part of the FRELIMO leadership and paralyzed the bilateral relationship. Part of FRELIMO’s hostility was linked to a perceived tolerance of Lisbon vis-à-vis opposition groups (RENAMO) in its territory (Gaspar, 1988: 63; Norman MacQueen, 1985: 49). In that sense too, the EC “cover” could offer some advantages for Portugal’s diplomacy.

2. Mozambique’s peace process and the EPC

The unfolding of Mozambique’s peace process throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s largely coincided with the initial phase of Portugal’s EC membership. Over this period, Lisbon’s relationship with its former African colonies was given a growing emphasis by a succession of centre-right governments. Greater domestic stability and political continuity was reflected in a gradual reinforcement of Portugal’s foreign policy instruments, at a time when the conditions for a peace settlement in Mozambique were progressively coming into existence. But while the pro-RENAMO activities in Portugal were a complicating factor for Lisbon’s plans in Africa, Maputo’s network of support in the West (including Italy, Britain and the United States) was being consolidated. During this period, European Political Cooperation was still the foreign policy arm of the Community. The 1986 Single European Act codified EPC rules and working practices, while linking it explicitly to EC instruments. As a result, the commitment of foreign policy consultations among member states was formalized, and the European Commission got more involved. But, significantly, no enforcement provisions were introduced and all decisions continued to be

made by unanimity. Despite the novel ambition of “speaking ever increasingly with one voice” and to “act with consistency and solidarity”, EPC remained based on vague objectives. A broad pledge of closer cooperation was made towards third countries across the world, including in Africa. But apart from Apartheid South Africa the continent continued to receive little European attention. By the early 1990s, the traditional priority given to neighboring areas in Brussels was even reinforced. Against this broad setting, what was the impact of EPC on Portugal’s diplomacy towards Mozambique during this period?

Between “outside” and attempts at projection

While not entirely disconnected from EPC, Portugal’s involvement in the Mozambican peace process was mainly “national”. Against a fast evolving international and regional context, Portuguese foreign policy-makers formulated plans for active participation in the resolution of conflicts that persisted in southern Africa as early as 1988. At the time, the prospects for Portuguese involvement were more encouraging in the case of Mozambique than in Angola, due in particular to the signs of greater openness coming from Maputo (Expresso, 27 Abril 1991; Venâncio and Chan, 1996: 55). Following official accounts, rather than making a decision to intervene Lisbon expressed an interest and readiness to have a role of “good offices”, ultimately dependent on the will of the parties. In that respect, Portugal’s status as an EC member would have reinforced its position.¹¹ According to some authors, the level of importance Lisbon put on ensuring Portuguese involvement (even if less intensively felt in the case of Mozambique than for Angola) was also indicative of the place Africa continued to occupy in the national imagination (Cravinho, 2005: 97; Venâncio and Chan, 1996: 54). In mid-1989, when some African initiatives to facilitate peace talks on Mozambique were developing, the then Portuguese Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Durão Barroso, travelled to Maputo, Zimbabwe and South Africa. Consultations were also made with Washington, which according to Durão Barroso, chose Portugal as the first country to have discussions at the political level on Mozambique (see Barroso, 1990: 45; Moose, 1995). Then, in September 1989, Portuguese Prime

¹¹ Interview by the author with Portuguese diplomat (Lisbon, October 2010).

Minister Cavaco Silva paid a four-day visit to Mozambique. Among the initiatives that ensued, Portuguese authorities had unofficial contacts with the RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama in early 1990. The main goal of the contacts appears to have been to secure a summit of Mozambican leaders in Lisbon during the visit of Mozambique's President Joaquim Chissano (also leader of FRELIMO) to Portugal, scheduled for April that year (Venâncio and Chan, 1996: 55-6; Vines, 1995: 143). The initiative failed as Chissano rejected the Lisbon venue, both because of its long-standing role as RENAMO's propaganda headquarters and the colonial overtones (Venâncio, 1993: 149-50). Ultimately, the Mozambican peace talks were transferred to Rome, where they were hosted by a Catholic Church group, backed by the Italian government (see Vines and Hendrickson, 1998).

Even as the chances of playing a leading mediation role were becoming more remote, Portuguese authorities continued to press for greater participation in the process, sometimes to the annoyance of the Italians. For instance, in September 1990 Portuguese military intelligence organized a visit to Lisbon by the head of RENAMO's delegation in the peace talks, who ended up meeting Secretary of State Durão Barroso. The visit caused great irritation in Rome and Maputo, as neither had been previously informed (Venâncio, 1993: 154; Vines, 1995: 143). Shortly afterwards, Portugal (as well as the United States, Kenya and Zambia) was invited by RENAMO to be a member of the joint verification commission set up to monitor Mozambique's partial cease-fire.¹² In May 1991, while the peace talks were stalled, one of the church mediators went as far as blaming "some Portuguese sectors" for the dilatory moves of RENAMO (Venâncio and Chan, 1996: 57-8). The following month, both the United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and the representative of the Italian government in the peace negotiations arrived in Lisbon for consultations on the status of the Rome talks and held separate meetings with Durão Barroso. The aim of those meetings is not completely clear, but the Italians appear to have wanted to secure support for its mediation and stop some of the Portuguese "interferences" (Venâncio, 1993: 154-6; Vines, 1995: 143). Cameron

¹² The members selected by the FRELIMO government were Congo, France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union (Vines and Hendrickson, 1998: 97).

Hume (1994: 65), an United States diplomat who closely followed the Rome negotiations, sheds more light on Lisbon's stance:

“The Portuguese, while not opposing the Italian mediation, wanted Portugal and the United States to have a significant formal role, one commensurate with the success they had just registered working together on Angola.”

Thus, Lisbon was interested in keeping its position linked to Washington. For its part, the Italians came to acknowledge the need for increased international participation at a later stage of the negotiations, but expressed doubts about the role Portugal could play (*ibid.*: 64-6). In that context, Lisbon authorities took some more resolute initiatives aimed at preventing Portuguese pro-RENAMO lobbies from interfering in the Mozambique peace process.¹³

Eventually, Portugal's participation in the talks was only upgraded in the final stages of the process. In effect, in June 1992 Portugal (together with France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the United Nations) was granted formal observer status in the peace negotiations.¹⁴ But that was far from the central mediation role Lisbon played in the Angolan peace process (supported by Washington and Moscow). Later, Portugal had an important involvement in the implementation of the Mozambican peace agreement signed in Rome in October 1992. In particular, Lisbon took part in all the international commissions that monitored the peace deal and made a significant contribution to the United Nations peacekeeping operation.¹⁵ Moreover, Portugal (together with France and the United Kingdom) began to provide military training for the new national army (see Alden, 1995). Apparently, in some Portuguese quarters there were fears over the British involvement. Some suspicions were also expressed that Mozambique was being “brought deeper into the Anglophone world” (Vines, 1995: 144). Officially, the high priority Lisbon put in participating

¹³ For instance, in July 1991 Prime Minister Cavaco Silva took “full responsibility” for the Mozambican “dossier”, in order to prevent any members of the Lisbon lobby obtaining information that might allow them to interfere in the peace process (Venâncio and Chan, 1996: 58).

¹⁴ During the negotiations, after Portugal and the United States got accepted by the two sides, the Mozambique government pushed for an increased involvement of France and the United Kingdom, while RENAMO was the strongest advocate of a significant UN role (Vines, 1995: 137).

¹⁵ Portugal's military participation in UNOMOZ involved 480 personnel out of a total of around 6,800, deployed by 40 countries (Teixeira, 2007: 84).

in the training of Mozambique's army was justified out of concern with the security, sovereignty and national identity of its ex-colony (see Gala, 1995: 189-95). Those military efforts (made both multilateral and bilaterally) fell naturally "outside" the EC, which at the time had no competences in that policy area. But after having failed to secure a leading mediating role in Mozambique's peace negotiation, Portugal's noteworthy military involvement in the post-conflict phase also suggested an attempt to "recover ground" for its own national policy.

In parallel to its actions "outside", Portugal was also active within EPC pushing for a greater engagement with the situation in Mozambique. Indeed, from the beginning of its participation in EPC Portugal gave great importance to issues related to southern Africa (Vasconcelos, 1991: 134-5). In particular, Lisbon participated actively in the initiatives promoted by the Twelve to strengthen relations with the Frontline States and started to mobilize political and economic support for Mozambique. Moreover, one of the arguments Portugal used at the time to oppose a policy of heavy sanctions on South Africa was the potential negative implications for Mozambique (Portugal, 1987: 199-200; 1988: 245). Yet, the high importance Portugal gave to African issues contrasted with the low level of priority attached to sub-Saharan Africa within EPC in general. To illustrate, when in 1986 a first ministerial meeting was organized with the Frontline States, intended to show opposition to South Africa's policy of destabilization in the sub-region, few EC foreign ministers were present (Hill and Smith, 2000: 403-4; Nuttall, 1992: 234). Following Neves (1996: 156), that disparity of priorities complicated Lisbon's position and led its authorities to promote the "upgrading" of sub-Saharan Africa's status within EPC more actively from the end of the 1980s. Subsequently, Portugal's plans benefited to a degree from the evolution of the political situation in South Africa, but they remained challenging.¹⁶ Thus, from 1989 the European Council meetings conclusions and other communications from the Twelve started to include regular references to Mozambique, specifically to its peace process. In general, those declarations welcomed and encouraged the efforts of peace in that African country. But contrasting with the case of Angola, the role of mediation

¹⁶ For instance, contrary to Portugal's initial aspirations sub-Saharan Africa was not retained as one of the priority areas for the likely development of the CFSP in the final report presented to the Lisbon European Council of June 1992 (Vasconcelos, 1996: 279-80). Yet, the following year, the Council adopted a CFSP Joint Action to support the transition towards democracy in South Africa.

which was explicitly indicated and supported in this instance was the Italian one:

“[the European Council] hopes that the talks taking place in Rome, under Italian auspices, will lead to an early peaceful settlement of the conflict in Mozambique” (European Council, 1991).

Interestingly enough, the conclusions issued in late June 1992, under the Portuguese Presidency, included a relatively longer reference to the Mozambican peace process, while keeping a generic indication of the role of EC member states in that process:

“The European Council urges the parties involved in the Mozambican conflict to reach, with utmost urgency, a peace agreement in the context of the mediation process in which EC countries play an active role. This will make possible the delivery of international aid to the affected populations, who are already suffering because of the prolonged drought which is having catastrophic effects throughout the sub-region” (European Council, 1992).

In more tangible terms, earlier that year the then Vice-President of the European Commission, Manuel Marín (a Spanish national), travelled to Mozambique for a two-day visit, on the occasion of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) meeting taking place in Maputo. The visit was also an opportunity to show support for Mozambique’s peace efforts, to sign some new agreements granting Community assistance and to promise further support after the conclusion of a peace settlement (European Commission, 1992). Whilst it is not entirely clear the sort of influence Portugal’s Presidency may have had in this particular event, a senior Portuguese diplomat confirmed that Commissioner Marín was generally supportive of Lisbon’s initiatives towards sub-Saharan Africa at the EU level.¹⁷ In sum, despite their limitations, those efforts conducted by Lisbon “within” the Community indicate that Portugal tried to combine the promotion of common European goals, with the projection of national preferences.

¹⁷ Interview by the author with Portuguese diplomat (Lisbon, October 2010).

3. Mozambique's elections and the CFSP

Over the period covered in this last section, Portugal continued to value its relationship with Mozambique. More specifically, following the end of the Mozambican civil war, Lisbon remained committed to the process of stabilization, democratization and reconstruction of its former colony, namely at the EU level. The creation of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), in 1996, opened an additional diplomatic channel for Portugal to promote its post-colonial relations, even if initially Maputo was not among its most enthusiastic supporters. Subsequently, Lisbon's bilateral relationship with Maputo gradually tended to improve. For its part, the EU has since the beginning significantly supported Mozambique's electoral processes. As mentioned above, Mozambique's signs of greater stability attracted vast international attention, including from the EU. With few success stories to point to in Africa, the Mozambique case became an "example" that international actors were more willing to continue to support. Seeking to promote democracy and the respect of human rights, the EU started to deploy election observation missions (EOM) in the early 1990s, in the context of its growing international ambitions. As noted before, the replacement of EPC with CFSP reinforced the formalization of EU foreign policy cooperation. In particular, the introduction of new policy instruments (such as Joint Actions) led to an increase in the level of CFSP activity. Yet, despite the links to the Community system, CFSP remained largely an intergovernmental policy area, ruled by consensus. Apart from sending observers, EU electoral support has also included the provision of technical and material assistance. While the Commission plays an important role in the planning and implementation of election support, member states have been eager to preserve their rights, namely in terms of the decision to send observation missions. Given this general background, what was the impact of the EU on Portugal's diplomacy towards Mozambique during this period?

Adapting for better projecting?

Portugal had a very active involvement in the first multiparty elections in Mozambique held in late 1994. Lisbon's efforts were mainly channeled through the EU, making relevant contributions to common objectives while

simultaneously trying to influence the process. In May 1994, during a EU ministerial meeting with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group taking place in Swaziland, Portugal presented a proposal for a CFSP Joint Action in Mozambique involving two main components. A first component of support for the country's electoral process included sending European observers and providing "integrated and coordinated" EU technical assistance. The second component consisted in a fund to assist with the reintegration of demobilized soldiers, implemented according to a "regional and decentralised perspective". The proposal also suggested the creation of a package of short and medium term measures to be applied immediately after the elections (Gala, 1995: 116). The overarching aim of this ambitious program was to "improve, coordinate and maximise the various initiatives that the European Union and some of its Member States have developed and intend to develop in Mozambique" (Portugal, 1995: 42). In fact, the Portuguese proposal followed the decision by the Twelve to support the democratic transition in South Africa (adopted the previous year), which Lisbon considered should be integrated in "a overall policy for the whole of Southern Africa" (Gala, 1995: 115). This Portuguese initiative was described as "controversial", namely because it went against the understanding that former colonies should be a *chasse gardée* for national initiatives (Vasconcelos, 1996: 280-1). In the end there was no Joint Action for Mozambique, due to the opposition of Britain which has traditionally privileged a more national and bilateral approach in Africa (rather than a regional one under the EU umbrella).¹⁸ Yet, in July of the same year, under German Presidency, the Twelve decided to provide electoral assistance, funded by the EC budget. It should be noted that around this period Germany was very active pushing for greater regional cooperation in Southern Africa (see Rummel, 1996: 56-7). More than 2,000 observers were deployed to Mozambique's presidential and parliamentary elections, under the United Nations umbrella. EU countries contributed to that effort with 200 observers (the so-called EUMOZ mission) and the EC covered a substantial part of the election expenses (European Commission, 2000: 26; 2004b: 11).¹⁹ For its part, Portugal sent a total of 42

¹⁸ Interview by the author with British analyst (London, December 2011).

¹⁹ The EC provided logistic and financial support worth €8 million, representing more than 50% of the funds needed by the Mozambican National Elections Commission (CNE) for organising the poll.

elections observers, 30 of them under EUMON (United Nations, 1995: 22).²⁰ Heavily supported by the international community, the electoral process in late October took place without major incidents. The results gave a clear victory to Joaquim Chissano, while FRELIMO won a majority in the Assembly. Against that setting, the EU joined the other international observers in declaring the elections “free and fair”, at the same time as it considered the overall process a “success” (European Council, 1994).

Mozambique’s second general elections in December 1999 coincided with the Finnish EU Presidency and the participation of Portugal in the Troika.²¹ Once more, the EU made a substantial contribution by sending the largest foreign observation mission and with EC funds covering more than half of the overall electoral budget (AWEPA, 2000: 3; European Commission, 2000: 26-7; 2006: 203).²² Headed by a former Foreign Minister of Finland, the EU mission included 64 observers from 12 different member states. Portugal’s involvement was noteworthy as it contributed 10 observers (Portugal, 2000: 241). The second largest foreign mission was a delegation from the Carter Center, with 50 observers.²³ In early December, the initial reactions after the voting from observers in general were on the whole very positive (Africa News, 7 December 1999). In particular, the EU observation mission in its preliminary assessment considered that the polling had been conducted “in a free and fair manner, allowing the Mozambican people to express their will” (Africa News, 12 December 1999). Yet, the final results were only released on 22 December, after a delay due to technical problems, which raised suspicions among RENAMO and observers. While Chissano was re-elected president (but by a much smaller margin than in 1994), FRELIMO increased its parliamentary majority. RENAMO declared it would not accept the results and demanded a recount. On 23 December the Carter Centre issued a statement expressing concern about the degree of secrecy surrounding the final vote count. It also reported that while no

²⁰ While also significant, Portugal had a comparatively smaller presence in the first democratic elections in South Africa held in April 1994, contributing with 25 observers out of a total EU presence of 312 (Portugal, 1995: 34).

²¹ Lisbon held the EU Presidency in the first semester of 2000.

²² The EC contribution was €21 million, against a total budget estimate of €35 million.

²³ The Carter Center mission was funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and by the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) (Carter Center, 2000: 3).

serious irregularities were found that could affect the outcome, concrete steps should be taken to resolve doubts about the results (Associated Press, 23 December 1999). According to a European Commission official, the statement by the Carter Centre took European embassies in Maputo by surprise, who decided to react promptly, without seeking prior permission from their national capitals. The urgency appears to have been substantiated with the risk of instability that threatened to undermine the initial “success” of Mozambique’s post-war reconciliation and democratization process (see Council of the European Union, 2000: 4).²⁴ Against this backdrop, on 28 December the EU Presidency released a declaration considering the elections “broadly free and fair” (European Council, 1999). Moreover, while stressing that the allegations of fraud should be resolved in accordance with the law, it also noted that the overall outcome was a “further step” in the democratic development of the country and “a firm foundation for continued cooperation” between the EU and Mozambique.

The pressure from European quarters on Mozambique became more conspicuous in the context of the general elections held in late 2004. Indeed, after the problems that emerged in the final stages of the 1999 electoral process, the EU started to press more openly for greater transparency in Mozambique’s elections.²⁵ Accordingly, after being invited by Mozambique in February 2004 to observe the new round of elections later that year, the EU demanded greater transparency and access to the different steps of the election process. More precisely, the EU wanted the government and the CNE to sign a memorandum of understanding granting the observation mission more access to the final counting and tabulation. After protracted discussions, a memorandum was finally signed on 7 October, allowing the EOM to be deployed a few days later (AWEPA, 2004a: 9; European Commission, 2004a). Yet, no real agreement was reached about improved access for the observation mission. Mozambican authorities complained against what they saw as interference in the sovereignty

²⁴ Interview by the author with European Commission official (Brussels, January 2011).

²⁵ For instance, in its assessment of the 2003 municipal elections in Mozambique the EU welcomed the conduct of the voting process, but also expressed concern over “certain shortcomings in the efficiency and transparency of the election administration”. Subsequently, those questions started to be raised in the context of the EU political dialogue with the country (Council of the European Union, 2004: 70).

of the state and accused the EU of forcing them to break the electoral law (European Union, 2004: 23-4). As noted by a Mozambican diplomat, the country's electoral law is based to a great extent on Portugal's legal tradition.²⁶ The issue was publicly raised by Mozambique's President during his last official visit to Portugal in mid-October. Speaking at a press conference after meeting with Portuguese President, Jorge Sampaio, President Chissano supported the idea of transparent elections, but also added: "what the European Union wants is to trample the law to satisfy its pretensions" (Associated Press, 14 October 2004). Later in his two-day visit Chissano emphasized the need for Europe and Africa to develop "equal-to-equal" relations and expressed his acknowledgement for Sampaio's efforts to develop this kind of relationship between the two continents. He further added that, after leaving his post, he would cooperate actively in the strengthening of the relationship between Portugal and Mozambique: "I reiterate my intention to cooperate with my successor in this perspective, so that our cooperation be more dynamic and effective" (Africa News, 15 October 2004).

Again at this election, the EU EOM was the largest international presence, including 130 observers (a larger number than in 1999 and comprising observers also from Switzerland and Norway) led by a Spanish Member of the European Parliament (MEP).²⁷ The EC also contributed around three-quarters of the entire election costs, but a smaller amount than in the 1999 election (European Commission, 2006: 205). That contribution included funding from the EC budget (covering mainly the costs of the EU EOM) and a comparatively larger portion of electoral assistance funded from the European Development Fund (EDF) (European Commission, 2004a).²⁸ Interestingly, electoral assistance was initially not considered for this election.²⁹ But after a belated

²⁶ Interview by the author (Lisbon, November 2010).

²⁷ A delegation of 7 MEPs (from Denmark, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden) headed by a British parliamentarian was also present (European Union, 2004). Other international observers included the Carter Center, the Commonwealth, the African Union, the SADC, and the CPLP. In contrast with the case of previous missions, the reference in official reports on Portugal's contribution to the 2004 EU EOM only mentions that it included both long and short-term observers, without specifying their number (Portugal, 2005: 242).

²⁸ The entire cost of the electoral process was €21 million, with the EC contribution totalling around €15 million. From that EC total, the share funded from EDF represented around 80%.

²⁹ After the 1999 elections the head of the EC Delegation in Maputo had stated openly that the EC would no longer provide financial support for elections (Tollenaere, 2006: 11). And, in fact, the

request from the Mozambican authorities, the EC delegation in Maputo (headed at the time by a former Portuguese diplomat) agreed to provide that support. In this context of urgency, the EC delegation proposed to channel the additional EDF funding via direct budget support, a procedure which appears to have left more control over the funds to the Mozambican government (AWEPA, 2004a: 8; European Commission, 2006: 204-5). Repeating the precedent of the 2003 municipal elections in Mozambique, the CPLP also sent a small (six observers) and short-term (one week) observation mission, led by a diplomat from São Tomé and Príncipe (LUSA, 27 Novembro 2004).

The 1-2 December poll gave the new FRELIMO candidate, Armando Guebuza, a landslide victory (about 64 per cent of votes), while its party renewed a comfortable majority in parliament. The process was marked by more irregularities than in previous elections and RENAMO called for the ballot to be annulled (AWEPA, 2004b). On 4 December, the head of the EU EOM gave its initial reaction to the voting praising the general conduct of the election, but also highlighting many shortcomings. Moreover, he warned that the observation would not be complete unless observers had access to all stages of vote tabulation (Africa News, 4 December 2004). A less critical assessment was provided by the CPLP in a statement released in Lisbon the day immediately after the vote: “[t]he CPLP observation mission did not witness any incidents, having verified that the voting process occurred in a climate of normalcy and civility” (Agence France Press, 3 December 2004). In the end, the promises of greater openness and transparency did not materialize (AWEPA, 2004b). During its meeting of 7 December the Africa Working Group of the EU Council discussed the elections. Among other aspects, the Group agreed that a EU declaration should be issued as soon as preliminary election results were published, and that bilateral congratulation messages would not be appropriate before that. The report of the meeting expressly mentions Portugal’s position: “[t]he Portuguese delegation shared the impression that elections had gone peacefully and smoothly, and it agreed with the proposed timing of an EU

subsequent EC Strategy Paper for Mozambique (2001-2007) did not include electoral assistance as a priority (see European Commission, 2002). In 2002 that head of delegation was replaced in his position by a former Portuguese diplomat, who remained in office until 2005. On a related note, during an interview a European Commission official mentioned that traditionally the head of political affairs of the EC delegation in Mozambique has been a “seconded official” coming from the Portuguese Foreign Ministry (interview by the author, Brussels, January 2011).

reaction to the elections” (Council of the European Union, 2005: 9). On 21 December, the same day the preliminary results of the election were published, the Dutch Presidency issued a declaration welcoming the “generally successful and peaceful” conduct of the elections and congratulating the people of Mozambique on their “commitment to democracy”. Moreover, while noting that some “irregularities” had taken place, the statement also pointed out that they “did not have an impact on the result of the elections”. Finally, the declaration included the formula of previous electoral processes considering the election a “further step” in the consolidation of democracy in the country and a basis for “continued cooperation” between the EU and Mozambique (European Council, 2004). The 2004 national report on Portugal’s participation in the EU is particularly explicit describing the role Lisbon allegedly played in the developments above:

“Within the European Union, Portugal has always sought to convey a positive image of the democratic transition process in Mozambique, having played an important role in the decision of sending the election observation mission and in the content of the Declaration on the presidential and parliamentary elections in Mozambique” (Portugal, 2005: 243).

In brief, the more coordinated approach of the EU in this electoral round increased the pressure on Mozambican authorities. In turn, that appears to have produced the simultaneous need for Portugal to give more visibility to its own positions within the Union. As put by a senior Portuguese diplomat, “each time there is a ‘problem’ with one of the Lusophone countries, Portugal tries to mediate and smooth harsher approaches in Brussels. But this needs to be done carefully, in order to bring something positive and avoid putting at risk Portugal’s own position in the EU”.³⁰

Conclusions

The purpose of this paper was to assess the impact of EU membership on Portuguese foreign policy, by looking specifically at the case of Mozambique. On the basis of the adopted analytical framework, the findings above yielded significant evidence of Europeanization, chiefly as “national projection”. In

³⁰ Interview by the author with Portuguese diplomat (London, April 2011).

general terms, Lisbon pushed for “more Europe” in the domain of diplomatic relations with Mozambique. This is an outcome that also serves Portugal’s interests, as a small power, which has had a complex relationship with its former colony, located in a sub-region where other member states have special interests. In that sense, Lisbon was very active within the EU promoting closer relations between Brussels and Maputo, in an attempt to successfully combine the achievement of common European objectives with the attainment of its own national goals. Yet, that was not always an easy process. Throughout the period analyzed here, more significant results at exporting national preferences onto the EU level were only produced in the most recent stages. In effect, during the initial phase of Portugal’s EC membership the opportunities for its diplomacy to project its preferences were limited, particularly due to the low level of priority attached to sub-Saharan Africa in general within EPC and the weak policy instruments of this form of foreign policy cooperation. Moreover, Portugal’s relations with its ex-colony were at the time complicated by the negative influence of Portuguese interest groups, while concurrently Mozambique had established close links with other EC countries. In that sense, Portugal’s close collaboration with the US and the UN during this period can be read as a sort of compensation for EPC limitations, but also as a way to reinforce Lisbon’s own position, particularly at the European level. In the subsequent phase examined in this paper, Mozambique’s internal developments attracted more attention from the EU, at the same time as the CFSP (especially when backed by EC instruments, as it was the case for EOMs) offered new possibilities of joint action in the foreign policy domain. Additionally, the gradual improvement of Lisbon’s bilateral relationship with Maputo reinforced Portugal’s claim as a valid “interlocutor” in Brussels.

As regards the level of “national adaptation” found in this paper, it was in general low. Through EC accession Portugal adopted the *acquis politique* on Mozambique and committed itself to coordinate its national initiatives towards its ex-colony with its new European partners. Yet the political *acquis* applicable to Mozambique was very limited and broadly in accordance with Portuguese interests. Moreover, it did not develop much more afterwards. In fact, intergovernmentalism remained a defining feature of this policy domain, allowing Portugal to keep its own national policy in parallel. Still, by and large,

Lisbon abided by its European duties and even displayed an interest in linking its national initiatives to the EU level of action. This was well illustrated during the Mozambican peace process, when Portugal's important level of national activity was not kept completely separated from EPC. Also in the context of Mozambique's electoral processes, Portugal's efforts were chiefly channelled through a European framework. The 2004 elections presented an interesting test in this regard, since the European pressure on Mozambique was higher and more coordinated than in previous polls, while Portugal's loyalties appeared split between the observation missions deployed by both the EU and the CPLP. The specific role Lisbon played in the deployment of the CPLP mission needs further clarification, but in any case Portugal subscribed to the EU position (even if given more visibility to its own specific stance) in this instance.

The level of "identity redefinition" in general appears to have also been low. In other words, EU ideas and norms had limited impact on Portuguese self-understandings towards Mozambique. A European approach in that country seems to have been valued by Portuguese foreign policy-makers chiefly for instrumental reasons. Thus, Portugal played the "Brussels game", but without relaxing fundamental national positions or perspectives. During the pre-accession phase Portuguese decision-makers stressed the utility of EC membership for enhancing Portugal's postcolonial relations. Despite this great emphasis on the instrumentality of the Community, more ideational factors favouring national adaptation might not have been completely absent at that stage. This is an aspect that deserves further investigation as decision-makers with stronger European convictions may have concealed their beliefs in order to facilitate the process of accession. In any case, a possible identification with European ideas was not necessarily incompatible with own representations in relation to Mozambique. In effect, while national and European objectives in Africa were presented by Portuguese authorities as "complementary", the specificities of Portugal's position (its African "vocation" and "sensibility") also received great attention. After becoming an EC member, Portugal's enduring attachment to its ex-colonies was readable in the efforts Lisbon made to play an important role in Mozambique's peace process (sometimes denoting competition, rather than cooperation, with some of its European partners). Along those lines, Portugal's open support for a broader (regional) and

coordinated European approach in Southern Africa, suggested the intention to help preserve elements of a “Lusophone identity” in an essentially Anglophone area. Subsequently, the greater “understanding” and “benevolence” Portugal demonstrated in the appraisal of Mozambique’s democratic progress is an additional element that appears to support the assertion that more national understandings and norms continued to imbue Portugal’s decisions towards Mozambique.

More broadly, EU membership reinforced Portugal’s options for conducting its post-colonial relations with Mozambique. For Portuguese decision-makers EU common objectives and instruments related to Mozambique became an important reference point. By and large, Portugal also subscribed positively to the general principles and values expressed by the EU. Yet that level of Europeanization did not compromise, nor even significantly constrained, Portugal’s national preferences and self-understandings. Instead, it opened new possibilities for Portugal to promote and reinforce its relationship with Mozambique. The analysis above indicates that in many situations Portugal “Europeanized” its national priorities, chiefly in order to benefit from the opportunities stemming from its EU membership. And, similarly to the case of other member states with a colonial past and smaller foreign policy machineries, the EU “cover” and “scale” proved a very useful tool for Portugal’s diplomacy. This rather instrumental approach implies that the Europeanization of Portugal’s foreign policy towards Mozambique represented more a “strategic adaptation” to common EU mechanisms than a “deeper change” or transformation of its national preferences and norms. Another important qualification is that the European “card” was not the only option considered by Portugal, as its national foreign policy was not superseded by EPC/CFSP. The incentives for Lisbon to conduct its foreign policy (more) through the EU were probably stronger during an initial phase, when its bilateral relationship with Maputo was more problematic and weaker. But, as noted before, European limitations at that stage constrained that possibility, leading to a (somehow unsurprising) significant level of national activity “beyond” EPC. Subsequently, the gradual improvement of Portugal-Mozambique relations contributed to reinforce Lisbon’s possibilities to “project” its national priorities through the European framework, but it may have equally contributed to a less active

Portuguese engagement for those matters within the EU, i.e. some “de-Europeanization”. Although further research is needed, these findings provide a more in-depth and nuanced picture of the EU’s impact on Portuguese foreign policy than the one found in the existing literature, mentioned above. Moreover, this study corroborates the utility of the concept of Europeanization to explore the specific European dynamics that influence and shape national foreign policy.

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