This article considers what this tempestuous tenth birthday implied for the EMP’s well-known commitment to encourage democratic reform in the southern Mediterranean. Three central points are conveyed here. First, the article stresses that changes underway in the Arab world have fundamentally altered the backcloth to the EMP. The political parameters of the EMP’s member states look very different today than they did ten years ago when the Partnership was created, both helping explain reactions witnessed at the November summit and changing calculations about what can usefully be done in the field of democracy promotion. Second, the article highlights that the celebration of the EMP’s tenth birthday occurred on the back of increased EU efforts to revitalise its democracy promotion strategies. While much policy since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 has embodied a more directly ‘securitised’ approach to counter-terrorism and migration, the article suggests that efforts to press democratic reforms have also intensified. Third, the article suggests that events surrounding the tenth anniversary summit can also been seen has having mixed implications for democracy promotion. On the one hand, recent developments and the culminating experience of the Barcelona summit in November 2005 reinforce the risk of democracy promotion being overshadowed by counter-terrorist concerns. On the other hand, the troubles experienced at the tenth anniversary summit may to some extent demonstrate that the EMP’s focus on democratic reform is at last ‘beginning to bite’.

I. Debating Arab Democracy

In assessment of the democracy-promotion volet of the EMP it is crucial to take into account how domestic debates have evolved in Arab states since the inception of the Barcelona process. Contrary to the impression that has sometimes been given recently, the discussion on reform in the Arab world is not new.[i] Arab experience of liberalism dates back to the constitutionalist period under Ottoman rule (1870s-1910s), which was followed by a period of parliamentarism under colonial dominance (1920s-1950s), and culminated in the wave of political liberalization – ripples of the so-called ‘third wave’ – which spread, albeit unequally, throughout the region in the 1980s. Of course, while the latter reforms were initially seen as evidence of incipient democratic transition, the momentum of change subsequently stalled.

In the context of this rich and fluctuating history, debates on democracy in the Arab/Muslim world have a long pedigree. With the Middle East long regarded as the ‘democratic exception’ in academic circles, the discussion on Arab reform has been broadly divided between culturalist and counter-culturalist arguments. Advocates of the culturalist thesis point to a fundamental incompatibility between democracy and Islamic culture, the latter’s features making it impermeable to democratising influences. Among such features, it is claimed, are the absence of the prerequisites to modernization, the priority of faith over reason, the emphasis on community at the expense of the individual, and the fusion of public and private, temporal and spiritual spheres.[ii]

Widely criticised for its ahistorical and undifferentiated view of modernity and democracy, the culturalist or Orientalist interpretation has been countered by the ‘contingent’ or neo Third-worldist view, which sees the absence of democracy as a reflection of worsening socio-economic conditions suffered by Arab peoples under years of Western-supported autocratic government.[iii] Emphasizing the existence of democratic elements in Islamic-Arab political culture and institutions, such views maintain that democracy is not only possible but likely under given conditions. This has led some analysts to see the broadening of political participation as evidence of democratisation, especially concerning developments within civil society. One notable conviction is that the prospects for liberal democracy in the region have never been so bright.[iv] From this perspective, the reasons for the persistence of authoritarianism range from the existence of ‘rentier states’, largely untouched by local pressures for democratisation, socio-economic underdevelopment and political culture, to external factors such as regional conflict (exacerbating the sense of regional insecurity and thus hindering any move towards openness), foreign dominance and Western support for autocratic regimes.[v]

Embedded in such longstanding debates and experiences, the issue of Arab reform has gained new vitality and momentum in the post 9/11 period. As is well-chronicled, the discussion on reform was given greater impulse with the publication of the United Nations Development Programme’s 2002 Arab Human Development Report. This Report enhanced the legitimacy of reform as an urgent pan-Arab issue. Openly critical of Arab governments, it denounced the deficits in education, good governance, freedom and women’s empowerment across the Arab world and identified political and economic reform as crucial to dealing with the deep crises (economic, political, cultural and social) besetting the region. Particularly relevant was the increased emphasis on the political dimension of development. In contrast to earlier UNDP reports, a whole chapter was devoted to the issue of ‘governance’, followed by specific recommendations on institutional reform. These included strengthening legislatures, making the executive more accountable, introducing mechanisms for the alternation of power, independent judiciaries and freedom of association more broadly. Development was defined in terms of building, using and ‘liberating’ human capabilities. The former two involved improving health, environmental and educational and economic reform, while the latter called for increasing political freedom through greater political reform. Political reform was thus not only seen as a condition of economic and social development, but also as a goal of development. Lastly, the credibility of the Report derived from the fact that it was authored by Arab academics, thus providing an insider’s look at the region’s problems of development. Although contested within the Arab world, the Report nevertheless highlighted the urgency of reform and triggered discussion on how best to implement it.

In this context, many recent political developments in the Arab region seem to indicate an incipient opening. Debate has never been so open or vibrant over political reform in the Arab world. New democratic elections have been held in the Palestinian Territories and Iraq. The assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri triggered what was dubbed Lebanon’s ‘Cedar revolution’. Reform to the Egyptian constitution allowed multi-candidate presidential elections and a plethora of opposition movements have become more outspoken in their criticism of president Mubarak; Muslim Brotherhood candidates won an unprecedented number of seats in the Egypt’s 2005 parliamentary elections. Morocco has introduced human rights reforms, most notably through a new civil rights code and the opening of investigations into past human rights abuses.

Polls indicate a growing degree of support for democracy across the region. According to a World Values Survey, Arab countries top the list – among nine regions including developed countries – of those whose populations consider democracy to be the best form of governance.[vi] The rise of moderate Islamism also points to a general acceptance of democratic practices. In Turkey, the settled acceptance of the post-2002 government led by the reformist AKP has contributed to dispelling fears over the democratic credentials of Islamic parties. The war in Algeria, sparked by the regime’s refusal to allow the Islamists to assume power through an electoral victory in 1991, has come to an end. In Jordan and Morocco, mainstream Islamists have supported gradual, stability oriented processes of reform, seeking cohabitation instead of confrontation with incumbent governments, and publicly rejecting violence as a means to attain declared goals. Acceptance of democratic principles is also apparent in the willingness to compromise shown by mainstream Islamists. Although many would argue to the contrary, the Muslim Brotherhood in most Arab countries (Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Yemen) seems to be working increasingly closely with Arab nationalists and liberals on two key shared goals: liberalisation of regimes in all Arab countries (which would strengthen the Brotherhood at the polls) and an ‘anti-imperialist’ agenda in opposition to US interventionist policies in the Muslim world.

At the same time, developments have shown the considerable obstacles that remain to greater democratisation. In the wake of a humiliating retreat from Lebanon, there has been further retrenchment of political power in Syria. Tunisia and Libya have remained largely impervious to new possibilities of change. And beyond the hothouse of political debate in Egypt, the regime has actually tightened controls in some areas, imprisoning opposition leader Ayman Nur, curtailing Muslim Brotherhood representation at legislative elections in autumn 2005 and ordering a new security clampdown. In supposedly-reformist Morocco, the Palace retained control over key areas of policy and after the May 2003 bombings in Casablanca gave security forces sweeping new powers to detain suspects. New restrictions have been introduced in Jordan on the activities of professional associations and political parties, while in Algeria power has become increasingly centralized in the hands of the president.

Such limitations have led some to qualify ongoing changes in the Arab region as little more than the ‘modernisation of authoritarianism’ triggered by fiscal pressures and legitimacy crises. This has resulted in the emergence of ‘liberalised autocracies’, or states that tolerate or even promote a measure of reform enough to meet minimal demands for change from within but insufficient to allow mainstream political groups to challenge rulers’ political power.[vii] The entrenched elites of such ‘liberalized autocracies’ continue to represent a powerful obstacle to reform.

Despite such limitations and obstacles, however, genuine debate has taken shape and real reform potential appears now to exist. This raises the question of whether the EU response to such evolution has been adequate?

II. European Responses

Arguably in contrast to some officials in the Bush administration, the EU did not ‘discover’ the need for long-term democratisation in the Middle East after the attacks of 9/11.[viii] The very nature of the EU as a project of peace-through-integration, together with the gradual move beyond mere economic integration towards a ‘Community of values’, has long encouraged the development of a range of policies to promote democratisation, prominent among which is the EMP. Launched in 1995 in the wake of the inception of the Arab-Israeli Peace Process, the EMP was intended as a programme combining bilateral and regional cooperation to address regional issues in an OSCE-like fashion, covering political/security, economic and social/cultural baskets. The underlying concern was the promotion of stability in the region; the unstated goal to prevent and control immigration from entering Europe by bettering political, economic and social conditions.

In practice, in the years after 1995 political reform was not a high priority within EU strategy under the EMP. Limited criticism of democratic abuses was forthcoming and limited resources made available to support pro-democracy civil society organisations. A neglect of Islamist moderates was seen by critics to have amounted merely to ‘introducing European values and goals because of their reputed democratic significance’.[ix] This contributed to reinforcing perceptions in the Arab world that EU democracy promotion policies were conceived as a means of undermining Islamic identity. The main focus was on supporting and pressing for economic reform; but this economic liberalisation did not bring political reform in its wake, as many had predicted. Moreover, the EU insisted on a process of trade liberalisation which was strongly skewed to its own advantage, manifest in the EU’s protectionism towards certain markets, such as agriculture and textile, crucial to the Mediterranean partners. This weakened the EU’s purchase on political issues.

After 9/11, the EU set forward a number of initiatives designed to reinforce the democracy and human rights dimension of Euro Mediterranean relations. The enhanced focus on human rights and democracy was notably apparent in the Communication issued by the Commission on May 21, 2003 setting out the strategic guidelines for ‘Reinvigorating EU action on human rights and democratisation with Mediterranean Partners’.[x] Crucially, the Commission suggested that it would begin to offer additional resources to those states willing to cooperate on governance and human rights reform. MEDA funds would be channelled for such purposes. Policy recommendations included the establishment of a ‘systematic’ dialogue on human rights issues, as well as that of a ‘technical’ subgroup.

Further confirmation of the enhanced emphasis on human rights and democracy in the EU’s external relations is apparent in the European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted in December 2003, as well as in the joint Commission-Council Secretariat paper on strengthening relations with the Arab world, dated 4 December 2003. The former emphasised ‘spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights’ as ‘the best means of strengthening the international order’.[xi] The latter goes beyond the vague enunciation of principles, suggesting that the combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches needs to be strengthened through a ‘firm and frank’ political dialogue and by identifying partners at different levels to build a dialogue with civil society.[xii]

In addition, the European Neighbourhood Policy framework effectively has enhanced a number of aspects of democracy promotion policy. The European Neighbourhood Policy, initiated by the Commission in March 2003, is conceived as a post-enlargement strategy, aimed at constructing a ‘friendly neighbourhood’.[xiii] Essentially, it is designed as an alternative to enlargement for those countries that do not benefit from the prospect of EU membership. Thus, ‘in return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms, including in aligning legislation with the acquis, the EU’s neighbourhood should benefit from the prospect of closer economic integration with the EU... the prospect of a stake in the EU’s internal market and further integration and liberalization to promote the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital’.[xiv] The new framework, it is hoped, will crucially serve to reinvigorate Euro-Mediterranean cooperation.

Reflecting the enhanced dimension on political reform, the ENP is predicated upon the principles of conditionality and differentiation. The former includes the setting out of political criteria, or ‘benchmarks’, to be fulfilled through Action Plans on a country-by-country basis. It is argued that such benchmarks would allow for the exercise of a degree of positive conditionality as a means of stimulating reform. Differentiated cooperation would allow the EU to reward those partners who are making more progress.[xv] In addition, there is the offer the new ENP Instrument, effectively an increased and streamlined aid package proposed under the 2007-13 Financial perspectives.

Predictably, such advances have been offset by a persistent caution that pervaded EU policies. Unlike with US strategy, there has been no dramatic ‘gear-change’ in European democracy policies after 9/11. Tougher EU strictures have been heard related to the need for democratic reform as a prerequisite to long-term partnership. Critical response to specific concerns over democracy has remained limited, however. Manipulation in the Tunisian elections, the imprisonment of democracy activists in Egypt, a restrictive law on political parties in Morocco, an amnesty to the perpetrators of human rights abuses in Algeria, patent gerrymandering in Jordan, clampdowns on salons in Syria, arrests of human rights campaigners in Libya: no such occurrences appear to have had tangible, negative repercussions for relations with the EU.

The ENP framework itself suffers from a number of ambiguities. Credible implementation is likely to suffer from the absence of concrete incentives and clear ‘benchmarks’ providing attainable and measurable targets. The prospect of greater economic integration and human mobility within the EU, two incentives addressed in the Action Plans, may provide a new impetus for reform. But the Action Plans recently drafted by the Commission fall short of granting genuine concessions on these issues. The ENP’s novelty with respect to political reform lies in the breaking down of ‘democracy’ into sectoral categories – but these remain largely generic and systematic, the guidelines for reform being virtually identical from state to state. The commitment to the ‘strengthening of shared values’ has not been fully translated into concrete measures in the Action Plans. Most Action Plans refer to the need to enhance political dialogue and reform and broaden political debate. Priority areas for support included NGOs, women’s rights and standard human rights legislation; the enhanced focus on political dialogue remains rather vague.

Most of the substance of the EMP is still not directly related to democracy. Lots of new initiatives have been introduced during the last two/three years that the EU has presented as part of its democracy promotion strategy: including a Dialogue on Cultures and Civilizations, a Euromed Parliamentary Assembly, a Euro-Mediterranean Non-Governmental Platform, a beefed up Euromed trades union forum and the Euromed economic and social committee, a new Euromed Youth platform, and the new Ana Lindh Euromed Foundation. Again, it is hard to substantiate the claim that these initiatives really have had an impact on political change. Indeed, a lot of the EMP’s famed cultural cooperation seems aimed more at not prescribing particular cultural or political values.

Alongside the enhanced emphasis on political reform, recent initiatives have also reflected increased concern for terrorist cooperation and immigration controls. By the end of 2004, counter-terrorist cooperation was formally included in all Association agreements – an obligation which applied to Algeria and Lebanon in the last stages of their negotiations – as well in EMP ministerial meetings. A new project carried out by the European Police College with police forces from five member states started in March 2004 with the aim of enhancing cooperation with southern Mediterranean police forces on ‘fighting terrorism’ and ‘human trafficking’.[xvi] Also by the end of 2004 cooperation on ESDP had been regularized, while the EU’s non-proliferation initiative incorporated a regional disarmament and WMD control process to be applied in the Mediterranean. EU relations in particular with Syria and Libya have been marked by a growing concern over the proliferation of WMD to the detriment of internal reform.

The renewed emphasis on migration issues was given form at the EMP fifth ministerial meeting at Valencia in 2002, with the inclusion of a new justice and home affairs pillar in the third basket and the resulting commitments to clampdown on illegal immigration. The decision to add JHA to the EMP’s social and cultural basket was followed by the EU’s insistence on including ‘readmission clauses’ in association agreements.

It would be wrong to conclude, as some observers have, that democracy promotion has weakened since 9/11. Rather, different approaches to security in the southern Mediterranean have developed in parallel, one focusing on the ‘political roots’ of instability, the other pursuing a more directly ‘securitised’ approach to counter-terrorism. The key question in assessing EU democracy policies is whether these two approaches are compatible. European governments have very deliberately and explicitly framed increased security cooperation with southern Mediterranean states as consistent with the aim of promoting democracy. The control of illegal migration and cooperation on counter-terrorism are strands of policy frequently said to be ‘in support of’ democracy.[xvii] EMP guidelines for new counter-terrorist cooperation stipulate that this should be developed ‘without prejudice to respect for human rights and democracy’.[xviii] Indicative of this argument is the EMP’s combination of the two parallel strategies into a new programme for ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’, which balances funding for security and law enforcement initiatives with support for judicial reform projects and vocational training for legal migrants from the southern Mediterranean.[xix] In its review of the EMP’s ten year record of achievement, Euromesco certainly reached the conclusion a more reform-oriented dimension to the EMP’s hard security concerns has indeed taken shape.[xx] However, such claims must be judged critically. Genuine ‘security sector reform’ progress has in practice been negligible[xxi], while Arab states have been skilful in deflecting reform pressure by playing the counter-terrorism card.

III. Into the EMP’s Second Decade

At one level the tenth anniversary summit provided the most dramatic example of counter-terrorist concerns overshadowing democracy promotion. Debate was overwhelmingly centred on the eventually doomed attempt to reach a commonly accepted definition of terrorism, and on the more successful aim of agreeing a new code of conduct for anti-terrorist cooperation. Diplomats acknowledged that these debates left little time for discussions over political reform in the Arab world. Of course, this was not the first time that differences over the definition of terrorism has caused problems for the EMP, for well-known reasons related to the Middle East peace process.

At another level, and viewed in more Machiavellian terms, differences at the summit over terrorism and the Middle East peace process took up so much time and exhausted so much good will and negotiating capital that some commitments relating to political reform were agreed that for some time looked to be in doubt. The overall perception was that the summit failed; but, to some extent, what prevailed was the inverse of the normal summit situation of ‘good atmospherics but weak substance’. At Barcelona in November 2005, divisive diplomacy captured the headlines, but below the radar screen of press attention some, if only modest, advancement was registered on concrete substance. The five year work plan agreed at the summit agreed on the creation of a new Governance Facility, which would be a ‘substantial financial facility’ to support willing Mediterranean partners’ in carrying out…reforms’; more explicit commitment to positive conditionality; and an enhanced role for civil society.[xxii]

Notwithstanding such new commitments, Arab reactions demonstrated that the notion of cooperation with EU states on genuine political opening remains neuralgic for Middle Eastern governments. The Algerian government was particularly sensitive, president Bouteflikka withdrawing from the summit – along with all Arab leaders, except Mahmoud Abbas – unwilling to be ‘lectured on democracy’. Egypt resisted mention in the summit text of ‘guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary’, although did eventually accept a diluted form of words on this issue. Most Arab delegations blocked reference to civil society as rightfully ‘independent’. The Governance Facility was originally proposed as a Democracy Facility, but the term ‘democracy’ was not acceptable to Arab leaders. EU proposals for a new initiative on election monitoring were also confounded and had to be diluted at the behest of Arab governments: it was agreed only that exchanges of ‘experience in the field of elections’ might be developed, ‘on a voluntary basis and upon request of the country concerned’ - clearly not a commitment to discomfort Arab leaders.

More generally, the significance of the Governance Facility remained uncertain. EU member states keen on according greater priority to pressing democratic reform argued that the Facility would provide an powerful new instrument for the EU, and attached particular importance to the fact that the states - such as Spain and France - traditionally most obstructionist of democracy-related initiatives agreed to the Facility. However, decisions were not made on funding levels for the Facility. New central and eastern European member states have argued against significant new injections of money for countries to the south where not accompanied by similar increases to the EU’s eastern neighbours. No set amount of funding was actually allocated to the Governance Facility, and no agreement was possible on what share of overall MEDA funding should be set aside for this Facility.

Crucially, the Governance Facility was not designed to provide democracy-related assistance but rather to let Arab governments decide how to spend additional pots of money given in reward for reforms. While EU officials argued that the change of wording from ‘democracy’ to ‘governance’ was inconsequential, it raised the prospect of relatively technical and anodyne change being rewarded. Language on rewards for political reforms remained vague and non-committal. The approach remains to build ENP action plans around governments’ own reform plans, EU assistance to be provided to assist Arab states ‘to go at their own chosen pace’, as one official put it. The notion of more firmly ‘benchmarking’ reforms was debated prior to the summit, but thought by most member states to be too difficult and/or inappropriate. Indicative of such ambivalence, differences remained between EU member states. The UK presidency saw the Spanish government as being willing to compromise too much on diluting new political reform efforts in order to salvage the image of ‘their’ summit. The Spanish accused the British presidency of ‘selling out to the Israelis’ and breaking the spirit of EMP partnership by the nature of its intensified focus on democratic reform.

Also at the summit, other reforms were agreed of indirect relevance to democracy promotion. The commitment to progress with the liberalisation of agriculture is potentially of great significance. A prominent Arab argument during the EMP’s ten years has been that partnership on the deepening of democracy cannot be possible while the same spirit of partnership is so patently absent from the EU’s agri-protectionism. The commitment agreed at the Barcelona summit was still hedged with caveats, referring to ‘exceptions’, ‘asymmetrical implementation’ and delays in the process of such liberalisation. However, it will undoubtedly assist the broader context for democracy promotion efforts if the summit does turn out to have been the first step toward concrete progress on the kind of agricultural trade liberalisation beneficial to the southern Mediterranean economies.

It is, finally, instructive to compare the results of the Barcelona summit with those of the second summit of the Forum of the Future held in Bahrain, also held in November 2005. There has been much debate within EU decision-making circles over the relationship between the EMP and the Broader Middle East and North Africa initiative, propelled by the United States originally under the auspices of the G8. Fear exists that the EMP risks being undermined by the BMENA’s Forum of the Future. In fact, striking similarities have emerged between the Forum on the Future and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

Like the EMP, the Forum on the Future has suffered from a relatively low profile, as evidenced by the limited attention paid to its second summit in November 2005. It has, also like the EMP, struggled to isolate the Arab-Israel conflict and has focused in practice more on supporting economic rather than political reform. The Forum’s summit also failed to get agreement on a final statement, and was similarly subjected to Egyptian-led resistance to enhanced democracy assistance – in Bahrain the issue being Egypt’s insistence that the summit document specify that only ‘legally registered’ groups should receive aid from the newly established Foundation for the Future. As with the EU’s Governance Facility, it was not spelled out what types of funding this Foundation would provide; a concrete $50 million was allocated to the Foundation, only a half of the amount allocated for a new economic reform fund. Seven EU donors committed funds to the Foundation, but the largest share of the latter’s finance will come from the US.

Arguably, agreement on creation of the Foundation for the Future did signal one difference with the EU, namely the contrast between a societal- and state-led model of reform. The US did accept the need for the Foundation to have an independent board of directors from the Middle East and for the new body to give the impression of distance from US policy. Forty civil society organisations participated on an equal footing with governments, and NGOs look set to become notable protagonists in the Foundation. In contrast, while debates have also emerged in some quarters of the EU over the creation of an independent democracy promotion agency, this is an idea still rejected by key sectors of the EU institutions. On both the giving and receiving side, the EMP model is still much more government-oriented than the Forum. In light of Europeans’ initial criticism of what became the BMENA, it is paradoxical that the Foundation for the Future may enjoy greater civil society ‘local ownership’ than EU funding initiatives.

IV. Conclusion

A symbiotic relationship has developed between the current changes within the Arab world outlined here and the evolution of European policy. It appears that a decade’s drip effect of democracy promotion discourse is beginning to resonate and seep into an ‘EMP consciousness’, while events have themselves helped propel a gradual ratcheting-up of commitments. Arab governments look increasingly defensive and nervous, manifestly caught between more open domestic criticism and a harsher international spotlight. Arguably, with the US spotlight much stronger, Arab regimes are more sensitive to parallel European criticism than they have been at any time in the EMP’s existence. The tenth anniversary summit’s widely perceived failure could in the medium term represent ‘success’, to the extent that tensions and the nature of political debates might prove that the effects of normative ‘entrapment’ are just beginning to be felt.

Of course, concerns remain over the tension between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security approaches, as well as over European responsiveness. The EU has continued to favour a gradual pace of reform that risks appearing glacial compared to some faster moving changes on the ground. This is not to say that fully-fledged democracy is imminently to breakthrough in the Arab world, but rather that the fluctuation of political developments in the southern Mediterranean in recent months has again raised questions over the EU’s capacity to ‘change gear’ in response to new strategic opportunities. Simultaneously the EU’s southern Mediterranean partners face their own ‘gradualism’ challenge: accelerating reform could pave the way for regime downfall, yet refraining from doing so is likely to deepen latent frustration across the Arab world. As the EMP moves through its tenth birthday the advance of both democracy promotion policies and of democracy itself remain uncertain, but the Barcelona process’s focus on these issues has certainly proved more stubborn than many initially predicted. And this democracy focus may now be firmly enough embedded, to both the south and north of the Mediterranean, for it be of greater consequence to the EMP’s second decade.